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KATZ ON A HOT TIN ROOF-SAVING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT FROM COMMERCIAL CONDITIONING BY




In a world in which Americans are tracked on the Internet, tracked through their
cell phones, tracked through the apps they purchase, and monitored by hundreds of
traffic cameras, privacy is quickly becoming nothing more than a quaint vestige of
the past. This situation has caused courts to analyze, consider, and wrestle with the
implications that these technologies have on the Fourth Amendment and on
privacy. This national dialogue has recently been re-fueled by the Supreme Court's
failure to resolve, shape, or offer meaningful guidance on these issues in its recent
opportunities to do so.1
In a previous article discussing the intersection of technology and the Fourth
Amendment, I proposed a reframing of the issue, suggesting that the problem was
more fundamental than previously characterized. 2 Much focus has been on sit-
uations in which the government has used a technology to conduct surveillance,
but I suggest that the issue is greater than governmental use of modern technolo-
gies. That previous article posited that society has reached the point about which
Justice Blackmin cautioned in Smith v. Maryland-the point at which privacy
"expectations [have] been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms."3 Society finds itself at this juncture not because of
governmental conditioning, as Justice Blackmun warned, but because of a concept,,4
I defined as "commercial conditioning.
That article outlined the Fourth Amendment implications of commercial entities
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. Special thanks to
Paul Ohm, Ric Simmons, and Thomas Clancy for wise insight; to Rebecca Ryan and Steve Young for tireless
research and commentary; to MPL, FML, and CEL for title consultation; and to Julie Kendrick for countless
rewrites and boundless patience. Special thanks as well to the patient staff at ACLR for their diligent work.
© 2013, Mary Graw Leary.
1. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding warrantless GPS tracking constitutes a
search based on a combination of 18th century trespass law); City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630
(2010) (finding regardless of whether defendant exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages
sent on a pager provided by his government employer, government's reading of text messages did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because it was work-related search).
2. See Mary Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial Erosion of Fourth
Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 PENN. J. CONsT. L. 331, 333 (2012).
3. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (discussed in Leary, supra note 2, at 337-38).
4. Leary, supra note 2, at 339.
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taking information from individuals' digital dossiers or digital footprints and
sharing it with others, all without affording the individuals the opportunity to ob-
ject. This conditioning cripples the current Katz approach to establishing a search,
necessary to trigger Fourth Amendment protections.5 First, it strips individuals of
the ability to demonstrate subjective expectations of privacy. Second, by creating
a climate in which no one has an expectation of privacy, these commercial entities
have precluded an individual's ability to establish any privacy expectation that
society would find reasonable.6
I have argued elsewhere that the most promising solution to this problem is a
legislative one.7 Similar to the "Do Not Call" list, I argued that a commercial entity
must give an individual the opportunity to demonstrate an expectation of privacy
in his or her information before invading one's digital dossier and publishing the
information. Specifically, that proposal called for a legislative requirement that
an individual opt into such information disclosure before such a disclosure could
be made. 8 This framework of commercial conditioning presents an "upstream"
approach to the privacy encroachment, asserting that the more significant threat to
privacy is not governmental conditioning, but commercial conditioning.
This Article further develops the concept of "commercial conditioning," and
explores not a legislative solution, but possible judicial responses to the growing
reality of private commercial entities eroding privacy expectations and thereby
expanding governmental power. This Article does not focus on the legality of the
commercial activity (such as online tracking), and does not call for its prohibition.
Rather, it accepts for purposes of argument that the political will to disallow the
practice legislatively does not exist. The Article instead examines the deleterious
effect of these commercial practices on the Katz test, and recommends the solution
begin from there. This Article seeks to guide the judiciary in analyzing evidence
containing certain private information obtained by the government from these
commercial entities. Such evidence should be afforded the procedural protections
of the Fourth Amendment when the government accesses it, a protection not
currently available to this private information. In so doing, this Article focuses on a
narrow category of information collection by private commercial entities. This
includes two types of information: information taken involuntarily or without
meaningful consent (1) by commercial entities with which a consumer directly
interfaces (primary party takers), and (2) by unknown third parties with whom
consumers do not have a direct relationship (third party takers). It further focuses
on the Fourth Amendment implications when the government seeks to access this
narrow category of information.
The Fourth Amendment is supposed to provide individuals certain procedural
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
6. Leary, supra note 2, at 339.
7. Id. at 365-66.
8. Id. at 366.
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protections when the government searches private information: namely, a warrant
and probable cause. In the absence of legislation regulating or limiting this data
collection (or government access to it), the Fourth Amendment should prevent
such data from being obtained by the government without any procedural protec-
tions. The sole reason this is not the case under our current Fourth Amendment
scheme is because of the role commercial entities have come to play in everyday
life. In response, this Article proposes that when the government seeks information
previously taken involuntarily from the consumer by a commercial entity (either
by primary or third parties) that information should have some Fourth Amendment
protections. Information taken involuntarily is information taken from the indi-
vidual without knowledge or adequate consent. Part I of this Article addresses the
data collection-both the factual reality and its legal implications--describing
commercial conditioning in more detail. Part II analyzes the precedent for
assessing the effect of technology on Fourth Amendment freedoms, as well as
scholarship, judicial opinions, and the views of individual justices who address the
issue. Part III outlines the proposal to reinvigorate the voluntariness aspect of
information disclosure inherent in the Katz framework. Finally, the Article outlines
why this minor judicial adjustment to current doctrine is supported by the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment and its corollary doctrines regarding third party holders
of information and state action.
I. THE PROBLEM OF COMMERCIAL CONDITIONING
Many threats to privacy exist, but the most serious threat to Fourth Amendment
protection in a modern technological age is not government utilization of advanced
surveillance technology.9 Rather, the threat to Fourth Amendment protections is
more fundamental and more "upstream" in the process of accessing private in-
formation. The threat arises from commercial entities' ubiquitous use of surveil-
lance technologies to obtain information on individuals and share it with others.
Often these "others" are companies seeking the information in order to effectively
advertise products to individuals. However, they also include the government
when it requests or purchases said information. This threat, referred to in this
paper and elsewhere as "commercial conditioning," harms individuals directly (by
actually invading their privacy) and indirectly (by eviscerating overall Fourth
Amendment protections).
A. Commercial Conditioning in Daily Life
Commercial entities often take information from individuals' "digital dossiers"
without the voluntary consent of the individuals. In so doing, these entities remove
from individuals' lives the precious commodity of a sense of privacy-itself
fundamental to true freedom. Professor Solove observes that in recent decades, the
9. This is, of course, not to say that this is not a valid concern and one about which society should be vigilant.
2013]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
ability to control and share personal information has been transformed.'" He
correctly notes this is possible because one's personal information is amassed by
the creation of a "digital dossier," a digital "collection of detailed information
about an individual."'" Palfrey and Gasser build on this concept with their term
"digital identity," which is a subset of information "composed of all those data ele-
ments that are disclosed online to third parties, whether.., by [] choice or not.'
12
Such information collected by entities can be as private as financial data involving
debts, purchases, and transactions; biographical information including race, gen-
der, and age; or more personal information such as health, medicine, sexual
orientation, religious affiliation, and income. This information is collected by
"companies [that the consumer may] have never established any contact with."' 13
Commercial entities' nonconsensual gathering of this personal information
from individuals' digital dossiers is commonplace-so commonplace, in fact, that
while many know that their information generally can be collected by entities, they
do not know how or exactly when. This Section will outline some of the various
technologies, devices, and hardware used by commercial entities to collect private
information. In so doing, this Article focuses on two types of data takings. The first
is when information is extracted by companies with whom an individual is directly
interfacing (primary party taking). The second type includes invasions by third
party companies with which an individual has no direct interface (third party
taking).
1. Privacy Intrusion Generally
The information within digital dossiers is not only information intentionally
disclosed by individuals. It also includes information combined with data col-
lected by entities without consumers' consent. 14 These entities then collate and
aggregate data collected online about individual users in ways that can reveal
significant information. 15 This collection and aggregation is fueled by the $23 bil-
lion American advertising industry that may pay web sites to advertise to their
users, and also by a new tracking industry that thrives on the availability of
10. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004).
11. Id.
12. JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES,
40 (2008). This article will use the terms "digital dossier" and "digital identity" to refer to the information
collected about individuals from their digital activities by commercial entities.
13. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083, 1092 (2002); see also id. at 1095 (describing digital dossiers as "digital biographies, a horde of aggregated
bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we
belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos we watch").
14. Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored
Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 211, 212 (2006).
15. See Leslie Scism & Mark Maremont, Insurers Test Data Profiles to Identify Risky Clients, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 2010, at A l (exploring use of personal online information by insurance companies to assess health risks
of applicants).
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information about individuals that technology collects.1 6 Even large companies,
which originally resisted the notion of tracking their customers, (think of Google's
motto "Do No Evil") cannot resist the financial incentives. 17 The Electronic
Frontier Foundation has warned there is a race to learn as much about users as
possible, and it involves "Internet giants" such as Google, Facebook, Apple, and
Microsoft. 8 That race also includes third party takers who take information from
consumers without consumers' consent.
The most intrusive monitoring comes from what are known in the business
as 'third party tracking files' . . . . The first time a site is visited, it installs a
tracking file, which assigns the computer a unique ID number. Later, when the
user visits another site affiliated with the same tracking company, it can take
note of where the user was before, and where he is now.
19
As Professors Brenner and Clarke note, "[m]ore than ever before, the details
about our lives are no longer our own. They belong to the companies that collect
them, and the government agencies that buy or demand them in the name of
keeping us safe." 20
16. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41756, PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION
ONLINE 1 (2011); FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 5, 17 (2000), http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf (stating that data collected by advertising networks allows
companies to make predictions about consumers' future tastes and needs).
17. Microsoft originally planned to block third party cookies, but internal forces altered this strategy. See Nick
Wingfield, Microsoft Quashed Effort to Boost Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2010, at Al. Google also
initially resisted income from tracking, but in 2007 it purchased the tracking company DoubleClick for
$3.1 billion and now places several tracking devices on computers with an opt-out provision for users. Jessica E.
Vascellaro, Google Agonizes on Privacy as Ad World Vaults Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2010, at Al; see also
Michael Liedtke, Judge OKs $22.5M Fine Against Google Over Browser Privacy, SEATLE TIMES, (Nov. 16,2012,
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2019699717-googleprivacyfinexml.html (describing court ap-
proval of settlement between Consumer Watchdog and Google in lawsuit alleging Google breached privacy of
Safari users by bypassing default security settings in Safari browsers).
18. Eli Pariser, What the lnternet Knows About You, CNN (May 22, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-22/
opinion/pariser.filter.bubblel-personal-data-google-and-facebook-web-sites?_s=PM:OPINION. "Google's deal
to purchase DoubleClick for $3.1 billion was just one of many Internet industry acquisitions over the last year.
Microsoft bought aQuantive for $6 billion, the Publicis Groupe acquired Digitas for $1.3 billion, Yahoo paid more
than $680 million for Right Media, an ad exchange, and AOL is believed to have spent $275 million for Tacoda,
an ad network." Louise Story, ETC. Member Vows Tighter Controls of Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/technology/02adco.html.
19. Julia Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, at Wl.
20. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 219. The extent of the invasion was demonstrated convincingly by a
series of investigative journalism articles published by the Wall Street Journal, all of which examined the main
types of surveillance technologies deployed on individuals from various sources. See e.g., Angwin, supra note 19.
The series found the most popular fifty websites install on average sixty-four pieces of tracking technology on
visitors' computers, often without warning or even disclosure to the visitor. Id.; Steve Stecklow, On the Web,
Children Face Intensive Tracking, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010, at Al. Some sites installed over 100 pieces of
tracking technology. A total of 131 companies installed such data on the Wall Street Journal's sample computer.
Id. Other studies have produced similar results with regard to the vast amount of tracking. See, e.g., MIKA D.
AYENSON ET. AL., FLASH COOKIES AND PRIVACY II: Now wrTH HTML5 AND ETAG RESPAWNING, (July 2011),
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Flash%2OCookies%20and%20Privacy%20I1
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This is not simply an advertising issue, but has other implications. For example,
a Wall Street Journal investigative series found the data collection practice on the
sites most popular with teenagers. Those sites placed over 4,000 tracking devices,
which is 30 percent more than the number of tracking devices installed on the
overall most popular sites.21 This occurs despite the fact that collecting such data
from youth has legal restrictions. Although federal law requires parental consent to
collect the names or other identifiable information from anyone younger than
thirteen years old, the taking of this information appears to occur uninhibited.22
Although the FTC announced expanded rules regulating some collection of
information from children through these technologies, the effectiveness and
legality of this expansion is in question.23
In analyzing this phenomenon, the taking of this information will be divided
into two different categories based on the consumer's level of knowledge or
voluntary consent to take this information. The first involves situations in which
data is appropriated from individuals by an entity with which the individual
directly interacts: i.e. primary party takers. The second involves collection by third
parties (third party takers) often without the knowledge of the individual at all.
2. Privacy Intrusions by Primary Party Takers
There are several examples of privacy intrusions in which individuals directly
interface with the intruding entity, and they often occur without any knowledge on
the part of the user.
%20Now%20with%20HTML5%20and%20ETag%20Respawning.pdf (stating that "[Of] 5,600 standard HTTP
cookies on popular sites, over 4,900 were from third parties. Google-controlled cookies were present on 97 of
the top 100 sites, including popular government websites .... Flash cookies were present on 37 of the top
100 sites").
21. Stecklow, supra note 20.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006) (prohibiting websites targeted towards children from collecting personal
information from all users and websites with actual knowledge that a particular user is a child from collecting
personal information). "Facebook prohibits children under 13 from signing up for its services, but studies have
repeatedly shown that millions of under-age children do so anyway, often with help from their parents." Somini
Sengupta, Facebook Says Child Privacy Laws Should Not Apply to 'Like' Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2012,
6:37 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/20l212/11facebook-says-child-privacy-laws-should-not-apply-to-
like-buttons/.
23. See FTC Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1-312.12 (2000) (discussing
amendments to Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule); FTC, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
MAUREEN K. OHLRAUSEN in THE 2010 CHILDREN'S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT RULE REVIEW, www.ftc.gov/
os/2012/12/121219copparulesstatement.pdf (arguing that recent amendments to the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act exceed the rulemaking authority of the FTC); Donna Tam, Children's Privacy Law Catches on to
Apps, Social Networks, CNET (Dec. 19, 2012 12:13 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57560037-83/
childrens-privacy-law-catches-on-to-apps-social-networks/ (noting only companies that specifically and know-
ingly target children would be subject to amended rule); Natasha Singer, New Online Privacy Rules for Children,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,2012, at B8 (explaining that new rule significantly expanded the types of companies required
to obtain parental consent to obtain information from child visitors to their sites).
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a. Computer based intrusion
The classic example is a "cookie," which is a small text file "that can, among
other things, be used to help track people's activities online to show them ads
targeted to their interests." 24 Not all of these track a user's activities, however. The
original purpose of cookies was user convenience, as they allowed the consumer's
computer to remember facts such as content of shopping carts, log-in informa-
tion,25 or the user's password upon his return to a website.26 However, as time
progressed, primary party and third party takers utilized cookies in more expansive
and intrusive ways (to count individuals' visits to networks or web sites, or to track
them more substantially).
Flash cookies have a similar history. Their original purpose was also user
convenience, but this evolved into one of data collection. Originally they were
meant to remember an individual's preferences (such as volume settings) for
viewing online videos using the Adobe Flash Player system.27 Similar to tradi-
tional cookies, these flash cookies store data regarding a user's online activities.
However, they are nefarious because they store themselves in a different place on
the computer than do traditional cookies. As a result, when an individual deletes
the cookies on his computer automatically or manually (as part of a privacy
protection process), these cookies may not be deleted.28 In fact, they can be used
to re-install regular cookies the user already deleted.29 Therefore, not only does
this technology attach to a user's computer, track his activity on the Internet, and
compile more information of one's digital dossier-it also actively precludes the
ability of the user to prevent its continued tracking.
Such tracking is not limited to retail web sites. Tracking devices are also utilized
by web browsers (which are necessary to merely access the Internet),30 and search
24. Vascellaro, supra note 17; see also, IT Glossary: Cookie, GARTNER, INC., http:/www.gartner.comlit-glossaryl
cookie (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (defining "cookie" as "a permanent code placed in a file on a computer's hard
disk by a website that the computer user has visited. The code uniquely identifies, or 'registers,' that user and can
be accessed for [a) number of marketing and site-tracking purposes").
25. Angwin, supra note 19.
26. Nick Wingfield, supra note 17; see also, WebWise: Cookies, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/a-z/c/
(defining "cookies" as "small files automatically downloaded to your computer by websites, which can contain
information about you and what you've done on that website for the website to view next time you go online").
27. Angwin, supra note 19; Stevens, supra note 16 at 1; Online Profiling, supra note 16, at 17 (citing definition
of "flash cookie" in FTC staff report); Ayenson et al., supra note 20 at 2 (July, 2011), ("Flash cookies, technically
called 'local shared objects,' are files used by Adobe Flash developers to store data on users' computers.").
28. STEvENs, supra note 27; see also Ayenson et. al., supra note 20, at 2 (explaining the advantages of Flash
cookies relative to HTTrP cookies for advertisers to use in tracking consumers).
29. Angwin, supra note 19.
30. Gartner Inc. defines "browser" as: "A software program used to locate and display information on the
Internet or an intranet. Browsers are most often used to access Web pages. Most can display graphics, photographs
and text; multimedia information (e.g., sound and video) may require additional software, often referred to as
'plug-ins."' ITGlossary: Browser, GARTNER, INC., http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/browser/. A "web browser"
is: 'The application program that serves as the primary method for accessing the World Wide Web... All
2013]
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engines 3' (which are also indispensable in using the Internet and World Wide
Web). These entities can collect data about an individual's activities on their web
site, and also "about websites people visit," in order to "track and show them ads
across the Internet."32 In the Wall Street Journal study, Google's tracking device
was present on 80 percent of the web sites visited. After Google's purchase of the
web tracking company DoubleClick, "every page where Google sold a display ad
began installing a DoubleClick cookie on users' computers.
With so many companies providing services across different spectrums, the
privacy invasion can be significant and unknown to even the savviest consumer. It
can lead to a privacy invasion not only by primary party takers, but also affiliated
entities. For example, in 2010 the FTC settled with Google charges alleging
Google violated the privacy rights of Gmail users when it created Google Buzz, a
social networking service.34 Google offered Google Buzz to Gmail users, and
enrolled them even when the users declined. The FTC alleged Google users were
not "fully informed regarding the extent their personal information might be
shared with, or exposed to, Google users outside of their own personal network.,
35
b. Cell phones and mobile devices
This form of commercial conditioning is not limited to activity on the World
Wide Web: the history of cell phone tracking is similar to that of cookies. In an
effort to enhance 911 wireless services, the Federal Communications Commission
required American cell phone manufacturers to equip most phones with technol-
ogy that would allow the phone to be traceable.36 The purpose behind this was to
enhance the ability to locate individuals in emergencies.37 Commercial entities
soon realized other uses for GPS tracking, such as the ability to record texts, record
GPS location at all times, and access other call details. 38 These services sometimes
require software to be downloaded physically to the phone. However, other such
browsers include bookmarks (Favorites) that store the addresses (URLs) of frequently used pages." Encyclope-
dia: Web Browser, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopediaterm/0, 1237,t =Web+ browser&i =
54278,00.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). Common browsers include Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, and
Safari. Id.
31. A search engine is "a Web site that maintains an index and short summaries of billions of pages on the
Web, Google being the world's largest. Most search engine sites are free and paid for by ads." Encyclopedia:
Web Search Engine, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0%2CI237%2Ct%3DWeb+
search+engines&i%3D54339%2C00.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2013).
32. Vascellaro, supra note 17.
33. Id.
34. See In re Google, Inc., No. 102-3136 (F.T.C. filed Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselistl/
1023136/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf.
35. STEvENs, supra note 27, at 9.
36. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g)(v) (2011).
37. Interconnected VolP Service; Wireless E911 Location Accuracy Requirements; 3911 Requirements for
IP-Enabled Service Providers, 76 Fed. Reg. 59916 (Sept. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.FR. pt. 20).
38. Justin Scheck, Stalkers Exploit Cellphone GPS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at Al; see also, AT&T
FamilyMap, How it Works, https://familymap.wireless.att.com/finder-att-family/helpContent.htm?topic= I (de-
[Vol. 50:341
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systems are provided by the cellular carrier and are activated remotely by
companies.39 While these services began without a nefarious purpose, such as
AT&T's FamilyMap feature, police do not need warrants to obtain such detailed
tracking information.40 "Federal law says carriers may comply with such requests,
and law-enforcement agencies have pressured them to maintain the tracking
systems.'
Cell phones and other mobile devices can facilitate threats to privacy in addition
to those associated with GPS capabilities. A significant portion of tracking is
accomplished through users downloading mobile applications ("Apps") to such
devices, which are small pieces of software that allow the device to play games
or perform certain functions.42 With the advent of smartphones, apps were a
$6.7 billion industry in 2010.43 Many of them have no terms of service or privacy
agreements, and they remain fairly unregulated. While Apple and Android claim
to screen them, many apps have been found to surreptitiously function as
information collectors.44 The Wall Street Journal found many commercial entities
use apps to gather identifying information from the phones, combine it with their
own databases, and then sell the information.45 Many of the most popular apps
scribing the A-GPS (Assisted GPS) technology and cell tower information used to provide most accurate
locations of family members, usually within a few hundred yards to a few miles of the phone's actual location).
39. Id.
40. Peter Maass & Megha Rajagopalan, That's No Phone. That's My Tracker, N.Y. TIMES TECHNOLOGY BLOG,
(July 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/thats-not-my-phone-its-my-tracker.html?-
r=0 (reporting that "cellphone carriers responded 1.3 million times last year to law enforcement requests for call
data... [and] [m]any police agencies don't obtain search warrants when requesting location data from carriers").
41. Scheck, supra note 38; see also FCC, E-9-1-1 MANDATE (May 26, 2011), http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/
services/91 -services/enhanced9l 1/archives/factsheet-requirements_012001.pdf (outlining the FCC's new require-
ments to provide more precise location information to Public Safety Answering Boards, or PSAP's).
42. See Emily Steel & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2010, at AI
(detailing Facebook's difficulties in restraining popular apps from harvesting and using users' privacy data).
43. Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: Your Apps
Are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010, at Cl. Gartner Inc. states that by 2015, "mobile application
development projects targeting smartphones and tablets will outnumber native PC projects by a ratio of
4-to-1 ... particularly where mobile capabilities can be integrated with location, presence and social information
to enhance the usefulness." Eric Savitz, The Road Ahead: Gartner's Outlook For 2012 and Beyond, FORBES,
(Dec. 1,2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2011/12/01/the-road-ahead-gartners-outlook-for-2012-and-
beyond.
44. See Hiawatha Bray, Smartphone Apps Track Users Even When Shut Down, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2,
2012, at B5 (revealing that "some smartphone apps collect and transmit sensitive information stored on a phone,
including location, contacts, and Web browsing histories, even when the apps are not being used by the phone's
owner .... ); Brian X. Chen, Why and How Apple Is Collecting Your iPhone Location Data, WIRED (April 21,
2011), http://www.wired.comlgadgetlab/201 l/04/apple-iphone-trackingl; Brian X. Chen, iPhone Tracks Your
Every Move, and There's a Mapfor That, WIRED (April 20,2011), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/iphone-
tracks/.
45. See Steel & Fowler, supra note 42; see also Declan McCullagh, Verizon Draws Fire for Monitoring App
Usage, Browsing Habits, CNET (October 16, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578-3-57533001-38/verizon-
draws-fire-for-monitoring-app-usage-browsing-habits (reporting "'we're able to view just everything that they
do,' Verizon Wireless executive has boasted. Privacy groups say initiative-including linking databases showing
whether customers own pets-may violate wiretap law").
20131
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transmit identifying andsensitive information as well as contacts, web broadcast-
ing history, and location, even when the phone is not being used.46 This essentially
provides access to individual's names (and possibly friends' names) to internet
tracking companies.47 The type of information taken can include important and
unique phone identification information and location data.48 Litigation has alleged
apps downloaded from Apple obtained identifying information without the con-
sent of the owners.49
The risk to privacy results not only from software, but also from the hardware
individuals purchase. Here again, the individual has little opportunity to demon-
strate an expectation in privacy. The dramatic increase in cell phone usage 50 has
lead to what Professor Paul Ohm refers to as the "one device" issue. The use of one
device to communicate leads to one device which tracks location, lists a calendar
and friends, tracks phone calls, and stores both sides of a texting exchange on each
"endpoint and on network servers in the middle.",5' The one device "coaxes us to
communicate through it, and then creates archives of what we say by default.,
52
This technology leads to the phone companies themselves threatening privacy.
They now collect information about their own customers, "anonymizing" it and
selling it to potential buyers.53
46. Bray, supra note 44.
47. Steel & Fowler, supra note 42; see also Bray, supra note 44 ("Angry Birds uses the phone's GPS and Wi-Fi
wireless networking features to track the owner's location, even when he's not playing the game, for example.
Another game, Bowman, collects information from the phone's Internet browser, including what websites the
owner has been visiting. And WhatsApp, a popular text-messaging program, scans the user's address book when it
is seemingly idle.").
48. Seungyeop Han et. al., A Study of Third-Party Tracking by Mobile Apps in the Wild, UNVERSTrrv OF
WASHINGTON TECHNICAL REPORT (March 1, 2012), ftp://ftp.cs.washington.edu/tr/2012/03/UW-CSE-12-03-
0l.PDF (finding that privacy threats are heightened on mobile devices "because they contain a wealth of sensor
data and personal information that may be used to profile users ... includ[ing] where users are and have been,
their phone numbers and contacts, call and email histories, photos, and calendar events" and that "some apps do
collect and send this information to third parties"); see also Maass & Rajagopalan, supra note 40 (detailing the
explosive development of tracking technology in recent years).
49. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (consolidating several actions
challenging the propriety of mobile tracking technology).
50. Cell phones are a necessity in American life, with over 85% of people owning one. See Maeve Duggan &
Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Activities 2012, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Nov. 25, 2012), http://
pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Cell-Activities.aspx (finding "fully 85% of American adults own a cell phone and
now use the devices to do much more than make phone calls"). Mobile capabilities increase dramatically with
each year, and now over 45% of adults own smartphones, and nearly two thirds of all young adults do as well.
See Smarrphone Research: Infographic, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2012), http://
pewinternet.org/Infographics/2012/Our-Smartphone-Habits.aspx.
51. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in A World Without Privacy, 81 MIss. L.J. 1309, 1315 (2012).
52. Id.
53. See Kashmir Hill, Verizon Very Excited That It Can Track Everything Phone Users Do and Sell That to
Whoever Is Interested, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.comlsites/kashmirhill/2012/l0/17/verizon-very-
excited-that-it-can-track-everything-phone-users-do-and-sell-that-to-whoever-is-interested/ (reporting "Bill Dig-
gins, one of the Verizon Wireless execs in charge of Verizon's new Precision Marketing Insights, which has the
enviable role of selling information about Verizon customers' location, Internet browsing, and app use-
'anonymized and aggregated'-to anyone who wants to buy it").
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Privacy invasions are not limited to new personal devices or the Internet. Even
television is moving to targeted advertising through cable boxes. 5 4 Cable compa-
nies will go so far as to match names and addresses of subscribers with data, or
take data on television viewing and match it with household data. Other
companies regularly swipe licenses, collecting all the information contained on
them which they later sell.56 Private entities are chipping away at privacy in every
aspect of daily life.
c. Cloud computing
Additionally, many people or businesses store documents or information
through "cloud computing. 57 Were these documents or pictures to be reviewed by
law enforcement in hard copy, a warrant would be necessary. However, the legal
framework that protects privacy in electronic communications, the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA),58 allows access to such documents with far
less than a warrant.59 As commercial entities migrate storage to the cloud,
consumers are forced to store their information at that location.
3. Privacy Intrusions By Third Party Takers
Even more insidious than primary party takers are third party takers, completely
unknown to the users. Several commercial entities obtain information about
individuals in a variety of ways, and then sell it to other companies, the advertising
industry, or even campaigns. 60 These methods are as broad as primary party takers.
However, they deserve separate attention so as to demonstrate the gravity of the
54. Jessica E. Vascellaro, TV's Next Wave: Tuning in to You, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2011, at Al; Stephanie
Clifford, Cable Companies Target Commercials to Audience, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2009, at B 1; Tim Arango, Cable
Firms Join Forces to Attract Focused Ads, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/
business/media/l0cable.html.
55. Vascellaro, supra note 54.
56. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers
Collect and Package Your Data For Law Enforcement, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595, 627 (2004).
57. "The 'cloud' [is] a purely abstract concept, originating in the presentation representations of the Internet
and networks for many years. The cloud comes into existence when one or more cloud services is delivered to
one or more customers." Risk Management Glossary C, COWENS RISK SOLUrIONS, http://cowensrs.co.uk/glossary
_c.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (sharing Gartner, Inc.'s defitition). Cloud computing is "a style of computing
in which scalable and elastic IT-enabled capabilities are delivered as a service using Internet technologies." IT
Glossary: Cloud Computing, GARTNER, INC., http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/cloud-computing/ (last visited
Apr. 18, 2013).
58. At the time of publishing, proposals to amend ECPA were being discussed in Congress, but the proposals
remained dormant at the close of the 112th Congress.
59. See STEvENs, supra note 27, at 12.
60. How You Can Be Tracked Online, ABINE, http://www.abine.comL/tracking.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2012)
(finding data companies "track you to provide targeted advertising, classify you into a demographic group, and
resell information about you to other companies. Similar to mall-order catalog companies that sell and re-sell your
name, address, and phone number to others trying to sell you related products"); see Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer
Profiles Users by Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2010, at Al (explaining how one prominent data tracking company
was the first such company to actually know and use individuals' names from data research); see also, Natasha
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invasion. It is one thing to accept that entities with whom individuals choose to
interface collect data, but it is quite another matter when the individual has no
knowledge of the entity at all.
a. Computer based intrusion
Unbeknownst to the user, these third party takers install cookies on the users'
computer, and these cookies both obtain details about the user and transmit them
to others.6 ' Privacy concerns arise not only due to the taking of information, but
also its subsequent uses. These third party takers "surreptitiously" track users'
actions and then segment the data into hundreds of categories, cross-referencing
it with other information, including age, political affiliation, gender, household
income, and marital status. 62 That invasion is remarkable. For example, an indi-
vidual interfaces with an entity and uses his email address to sign on or become a
member. That company sends the email address to an online tracking company,
who then installs a cookie on the individual's computer to track private informa-
tion. While users are generally aware that much is tracked online and they cannot
control it, this specific placing of items on their computer to track them occurs
unbeknownst to the user.
Although the entities claim this data is anonymous, it often is not.6 3 Many of
these companies acknowledge they collect such information, but claim that they do
not sell names to their clients. 64 However, some companies concede they will send
personal information to a campaign or company that already has the email address
of the individual.65 This fictional anonymity was illustrated by the Wall Street
Journal's coverage of banks' use of such information. A user arrives at a bank's
homepage and the third party "instantly scans the information passed between the
person's computer and the web page which can be thousands of lines of code
containing details of the user's computer. '66 The entity then can identify where the
computer is physically located and access its web browsing history through other
databases.67 Although the third party will characterize this activity as anonymous,
it is reliable enough that banks make decisions whether or not to loan money based
Singer & Charles Duhigg, Tracking Voters' Clicks Online to Try to Sway Them, N.Y TtMES, Oct. 27, 2012, at A16
(explaining how political campaigns have begun using data tracking companies to enlist voters).
61. Elinor Mills, Behavioral Data Tracking Rising Dramatically (Q&A), CNET (June 19, 2012), http://
news.cnet.com8301-1009_3-57456273-83/behavioral-data-tracking-rising-dramatically-q-a/; see, e.g., Steel, supra
note 60.
62. Steel, supra note 60; Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web's Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2010, at A1. Such tracking is also done through the use of cell phones. See, e.g., Hill, supra
note 53.
63. Steel, supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Steel & Angwin, supra note 62.
67. Id.
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on this information.68 The user does not know of this third party taker, nor of the
item placed on his computer.
Another method of third party taking is data scraping. These "scrapers" go to a
site and use sophisticated software to "scrape" data from the site.69 While "data"
sounds innocuous, this scraping can include copying every message from an on-
line forum.70 Not only do these entities "harvest online conversations" which can
be highly personal (such as fora that concern medical, personal, or financial issues)
where users believe they are anonymous; but these entities also "collect personal
details from social-networking sites [and] r6sum6 sites. 71 Some then connect the
data with real names. For example, the Wall Street Journal series reported on a
company seeking a patent that will allow it to "match[] people's real names to the
pseudonyms they use on blogs, Twitter and other social networks. 72 Another
commercial entity has been documented to have matched data from social
networking sites with email addresses, and indexed over 600 million email
addresses. 73 This effectively connects databases of information to cookies surrep-
titiously placed on computers, and combines offline profiles with online tracking.7 4
Again, in such situations, the individual may have voluntarily shared very limited
information (such as his email address) with a primary party. In so doing, he did
not voluntarily share, or even knowingly risk sharing, all that he does both on and
offline.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has expressed concern regarding these
so-called data brokers and their deceptive practices. One commercial entity
allowed customers to pay a fee to opt out of tracking, yet their personal
information continued to be available to other companies.75 Another gained access
68. Id.
69. Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, 'Scrapers' Dig Deep For Data on Web, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703358504575544381288117888.html; George H. Fibbe, Screen-
Scraping and Harmful Cybertrespass After Intel, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1011, 1012-13 (2004) ("Screen-scraping,
also called data aggregation or indexing, encompasses technologies variously referred to as robots, spiders,
crawlers, or automated devices. Disputes over screen-scraping tend to be between business actors and involve
unauthorized access to websites for profit .... ).
70. See Angwin & Stecklow, supra note 69; Fibbe, supra note 69.
71. Angwin & Stecklow, supra note 69; Escaping the 'Scrapers, DIGITS WALL ST. J. BLOG, (Oct. 11, 2010,
9:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/20l0/10/11/escaping-the-scrapers/ (explaining "the sites gather informa-
tion from public sources such as property records and telephone listings, and other information is harvested by
"scraping"-or copying-websites where people post information about themselves"). For a list of online data
brokers and scrapers, see Online Data Vendors: How Consumers Can Opt Out of Directory Services and Other
Information Brokers, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/online-information-brokers-
list (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
72. Angwin & Stecklow, supra note 69.
73. See Steel, supra note 60; see also, RAPLEAF, https://www.rapleaf.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2013)
(advertising others to "instantly get data such as age, gender, and more. Upload a file in any of these supported
formats: xls, .xlsx, .txt, .csv, with any number of email addresses").
74. Steel, supra note 60.
75. In re Chitika, Inc., No. 102-3087, 2011 WL 914035 (F.T.C. Mar. 14, 2011) (consent order accepted for
public comment); STEVENS, supra note 27, at 9.
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to personal information by selling tracking software to parents so that they
could monitor their children's online activity, but then sold the information
collected about the children to others. 76 While data-collecting firms gather infor-
mation from public records, they also conduct surveys to deceive people into
revealing information concerning their lifestyle, health, and personal information,
ultimately in order to sell it.
77
The technologies being developed are far more intrusive and sophisticated than
just cookies. Beacons, also known as web bugs or pixels, allow the collection of
much more personal information. These are "small pieces of software that run on a
web page. They can track what a user is doing on the page, including what is being
typed or where the mouse is moving. '78 They can capture what a user sees on the
web site, including the user's comments or interests, and "package[] that data into
profiles about individuals, without determining a person's name.",79 This package
is then sold to other companies.8°
The tracking of users' information is not limited to web site visits or forum
information. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is another method used by commercial
entities. When information is sent and received over the Internet it is done so in
packets of information labeled with a header, which indicates where the packet
came from and where it is going.8' DPI documents "every web page visited, every
email sent and every search entered. Every bit of data is divided into packets-like
76. STEVENS, supra note 27, at 8; F.T.C. v. Echometrix, Inc., No. 1OCV-5516, 2010 WL 4926541 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2010).
77. Angwin & Stecklow, supra note 69.
78. Angwin, supra note 19; Francoise Gilbert, Beacons, Bugs, and Pixel Tags: Do You Comply with the FTC
Behavioral Marketing Principles and Foreign Law Requirements?, 11 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (2008) (stating that
"Web beacons... are different from cookies ... [theyjare inconspicuous to the user. They consist of a small
string of software code, typically 1-by-I pixel in size, that is placed on a Web page or an email message to track
pages viewed or emails opened"). In the Wall Street Journal investigation, a majority of the sites visited placed at
least seven beacons from third companies on the user's computer. Angwin, supra note 19.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Duncan Geere, How Deep Packet Inspection Works, WIRED CO. UK (April 27, 2012), http://
www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-04/27/how-deep-packet-inspection-works; Ralf Bendrath, Global Technol-
ogy Trends and National Regulation: Explaining Variation in the Governance of Deep Packet Inspection 10
(2009), http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/bendrath/PaperRalf-BendrathDPI-V I -5.pdf. Prior to DPI, Shallow Packet
Inspection (SPI) occurred where headers or just a few packets were inspected, usually to prioritize traffic over the
Internet or ensure no viruses entered a system. BENDRATH, supra note 81. "[Deep Packet Inspection] is the Internet
equivalent of the Postal Service reading your mail .... ISPs are opening these envelopes, reading their contents,
and keeping varying amounts of information about the communications inside for their own purposes." Paul
Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1417, 1453 (2009) (quoting Broadband
Providers and Consumer Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 110th Cong. 15
(2008) (testimony of Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge)). It was and it is quicker and more efficient than
examining each piece of data. Geere, supra note 81. DPI, however, takes this examination to a new level of
intrusiveness. It is much more intrusive than cookies or SPI. Cookies count the number of times a user may go to a
particular web site, but DPI monitors all activity. Steve Stecklow & Paul Sonne, Shunned Profiling Technology on
the Verge of Comeback, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, atA1.
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electronic envelopes-that the system can access and analyze for content.
' 82
The purpose of DPI can vary from the objectively reasonable to the nefarious.
As with the other technologies previously discussed, the history of DPI reflects a
move to the latter. It can be used to filter out malware, to block traffic that will use a
great deal of bandwidth, or to block illegal or copyrighted material. It can also be
used for government surveillance, censorship (as is done in China), or advertise-
ment injection into websites to match the user's interests.83 When network
providers engage in this it is akin to the letter carrier opening a letter and resealing
it.84 Indeed, network providers have access to a subscriber's identity and web
surfing information because they are the ones who transport it. As a result, third
party takers offer these providers the DPI service, obtain this information, and then
inject advertisements into to the websites the user visits. 85 Initially, when some
entities announced an intent to utilize DPI in 2007 and 2008, the United States
Congress and the European Union met them with alarm.8 6 However, it has made a
comeback as of 2010, given the potential profits to service providers for handing
over this valuable and unique data: a $20 billion dollar online advertising
industry.87
b. Device based invasions
Third party inspection is not limited to software, either. "Fingerprinting de-
vices" are another effort of third party takers. It has been reported that some
companies are attempting to build a "credit bureau" for devices, which will create
a profile for every cell phone or computer. This information will include informa-
tion on who the user is, his online behavior, demographics, etc.88 It is created by
using the unique data located on a device to identify the user and create a profile
for the device which will be sold. This is done by embedding the technology in a
web site or app. 89 A user connects to a web site with his email address and the
website shares the information with an offline data company which obtains
information about the user, strips the name, and sends the information to the
"fingerprinting" company which combines that information with the profile it has
82. Peter Whoriskey, Every Click You Make, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2008, at G01.
83. Geere, supra note 81.
84. Id.
85. BENDRATH, supra note 81.
86. Id.; Geere, supra note 81.
87. See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Race Is on to 'Fingerprint' Phones, PCs, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 30, 2010, at A 1; Whoriskey, supra note 82.
88. Id.; see also Robert Vamosi, Device Fingerprinting to Fight Real-Time Transaction Fraud, FORBES,
March 17, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/sites/firewal /20103/17/device-fingerprinting-to-fight-real-time-
transaction-fraud/ (discussing companies such as ThreatMetix which use device fingerprinting methodology to
probe beyond mere cookies and browser data to identify the machine being used for online access in order to fight
fraud).
89. Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 87.
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created of the devices. 90 These companies hold onto this data for an unlimited
time, and users are never notified by these third companies that their devices are
being fingerprinted. 9'
B. Commercial Conditioning and Data Collection is Not Voluntary
Thus far, this article has described this information collection as "involuntary."
No doubt commercial entities, whether primary or third party takers, would
disagree, pointing to privacy policies. These are the privacy terms, often within a
terms of service agreement, dictated to a consumer in exchange for access to the
service. The industry would likely argue that, far from being involuntary, such a
taking of information is fully voluntary because notice is given to the user that this
could happen within the privacy policy. This argument fails both legally and
factually.
1. Legally
The concept of voluntariness is one that pervades criminal procedure and is
fairly uniformly understood. Two areas where voluntariness is integral include the
Fifth Amendment requirement that a statement be voluntary, as well as the Fourth
Amendment requirement that consent to search be voluntary. 92 Such situations-
making a statement to the police or consenting to a search-are analogous to the
activity at issue in this Article. At their essence, a statement to police or a consent
to search are disclosures of information. The industry defends itself by arguing that
data collection is also based on consent. Therefore, the legal principles surround-
ing voluntariness of these disclosures (statements or searches) are applicable.
The test of voluntariness "remains ... the only clearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years ... . For a disclosure of informa-
tion-i.e., a statement-to be voluntary, the disclosure must be "the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."' 9 4 A statement is not such a
product if the individual's will was overborne in order to obtain the information.95
A voluntary disclosure of information cannot be the "result of duress or coercion,




92. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (discussing the voluntariness test applied to
custodial interrogation); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (stating "where there is coercion there
cannot be consent"); Alexander v. United States, 390 E2d 101, 109 (5th Cir. 1968) (requiring "careful scrutiny for
any 'force or compulsion' which may preclude voluntary choice by the defendant").
93. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26.
94. E.g., Degraffenreid v. McKellar, 883 F.2d 68, 1 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225).
95. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
96. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
97. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
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Voluntariness cannot be presumed solely because the individual gives a state-
ment or allows a search. Similarly, voluntary information sharing cannot be
presumed solely because information has been collected. It must be separately
established that such a disclosure was voluntary.98 Research suggests that volun-
tariness cannot be established simply by establishing the data collection. The
public possesses one of two states of mind, neither of which establishes voluntari-
ness. Either individuals feel a loss of privacy due to commercial conditioning,
and they are merely acquiescing to the privacy invasion, or they are ignorant of the
level of data collection, because many consumers incorrectly believe that primary
takers cannot share information about them with third parties.99 The first is invalid
because "mere acquiescence" is not voluntary.'00 The second is also involuntary,
because if one does not know information is being taken, one cannot have
voluntarily consented to it.
Similarly, involuntary disclosures are not solely the result of physical coer-
cion, but can also result from certain types of misrepresentation'
° or deception. 102
When a person is deceived in obtaining information, the law is murky as to
whether his consent is valid, and it often turns on whether the deception was
fair. 103 Regarding statements, such a disclosure of information may not be
voluntary if law enforcement misrepresents the effect on the individual of failing
to disclose the information.' °4 It is not considered fair to obtain consent to search
for one item and then use that consent to collect something vastly different.1
0 5
Courts have refused to find voluntary consent in such cases because such a practice
encourages the use of "a seemingly precise and legal warrant only as a ticket to get
into a man's home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined searches and
indiscriminate seizures as if armed with all the unbridled and illegal power of a
98. E.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234; Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1991)
(citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980)).
99. Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy's Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (2012).
100. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
101. As the Third Circuit notes in the context of statements, "when evidence exists to show ... that a
defendant believed he must consent such evidence weighs heavily against a finding that consent was voluntarily
given. And when that belief stems directly from misrepresentations ... we deem the consent even more
questionable." United States v. Molt, 589 F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (3d. Cir. 1978).
102. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 n.8 (1987) (noting in certain circumstances affirmative
misrepresentations by the police can invalidate a suspect's waiver to voluntarily speak to police).
103. See State v. LaFave, 801 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that a defendant asserted that her
statements were "'obtained through misrepresentations that overcame her free will to give a knowing, voluntary
and intelligent statement and as a result, her statement was not voluntary' because she "was 'tricked' or police
used misrepresentations to cause her to give up [her] ... rights"); People v. Jefferson, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1973) (holding that consent was not voluntary and search violated the Fourth Amendment where officers
obtained entry by saying that they were investigating a gas leak).
104. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (misrepresentation that receipt of financial aid and
custody of children was conditioned upon disclosure of information to the police); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959) (misrepresentation that friend's job was conditioned upon disclosure of information).
105. E.g., People v. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Jefferson, 350 N.Y.S 2d 3.
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general warrant."' 0 6 The same should be true in the disclosure of information.
If a commercial entity obtains information deceptively (say, requiring an email
address to sign on but using that email address to collect and aggregate personal
information), such data collection should not be considered voluntary. The purpose
for the disclosure is wholly different from the collection and makes such a
disclosure involuntary.
2. Factually
Privacy policies do not necessarily transform coercive or unfairly deceptive
efforts to obtain information into voluntary disclosures. It is well documented that
privacy policies are inadequate protectors of the users. '0 7 Indeed, the Commerce
Department's Internet Policy Task Force examined whether commercial data
privacy policy advances all the goals of protecting consumer trust in an Internet
economy as well as "promoting innovation."' 0 8 It concluded that the "basic ele-
ment of current consumer data privacy framework, the privacy policy, is ineffec-
tive because it is often a lengthy, dense, and legalistic document."' 0 9 One reason
they can be inadequate is because they can be written in a way that makes them not
truly voluntary agreements to disclose known information for known purposes.
This lack of voluntary consent is manifested in numerous ways.
First, they often fail to include notice that the entity with whom the user
interfaces takes the user's information and shares it with other specific entities. " 0
For example, in 2012 Google announced a plan to integrate data across all its
products, claiming it would "better tailor its ads to people's tastes."'" What it did
do was send personal information across all its platforms without any say from the
consumer. 12 ,
Second, even if the language stating the primary taker "may" engage in such
activity is present, the language describing that risk may be so deceptive to be
106. United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 130 (7th Cir. 1971).
107. See Matthew A. Goldberg, The Googling of Online Privacy: Gmail, Search-Engine Histories and the
New Frontier of Protecting Private Information on the Web, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 249, 272, n.33 (2005)
(discussing the enforceability of websites' privacy Terms of Use); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies:
Contracting Away Control Over Personal Information?, 1II PENN. ST. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (2007) (noting
consumers are not likely to read or understand privacy policies); id. at 609 (noting privacy policies often fail to
protect consumers but do protect companies).
108. STEVENS, supra note 27, at 10.
109. Id.
110. FTC, MOBILE AppS FOR KIDS: DISCLOSURES STILL NOT MAKING THE GRADE 1 (Dec. 2012), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2012/12/121210mobilekidsappreport.pdf ("[M]any apps... shared kids' information... with-
out disclosing these practices to parents.").
111. Cecilia Kang, Google Announces Privacy Changes Across Products; Users Can't Opt Out, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 2012, at B1.
112. Hiawatha Bray, Google Policy on Data Brings Privacy Worry, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2012, at BI.
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considered unfair. 11 3 Private entities draft these contracts in such a way that it is
very challenging to determine the entities' view of a given issue.' 14 Some
companies only vaguely disclose that they are engaged with tracking.11 5 For
example, The Washington Post discussed a test run by Knology, a service provider,
regarding a deep packet inspection run on several hundred customers. However,
the company's twenty-seven-page customer service agreement only contained a
"vague reference" to its tracking system, and consumer advocates questioned
whether users were properly informed about such practices.' 16 When an Internet
service provider mines the information of its user, the FTC advises that at least the
broadband provider should notify customers and obtain their consent.
1 7
Furthermore, commercial entities sometimes mask their privacy practices and
then change them once they have obtained the personal data of users.t 8 Privacy
agreements or terms of service agreements may possess somewhat more clear
language when a user joins a service, but then the entity alters the terms in ways
unforeseen at the time of the original agreement. While the data may originally be
disclosed somewhat voluntarily under the original terms of the agreement, the
unilateral changes to the terms made by the primary taker which change the nature,
purpose, and scope of the privacy compromise can make the collection of this
information involuntary. The current market binds a consumer to that original
disclosure even if the agreement is altered. It is certainly not voluntary and
informed if it requires individuals to anticipate unknown future changes not only in
the agreement, but in the identity of the other party. Moreover, the consumer is
disadvantaged because the primary taker often possesses more knowledge of the
financial value of the consumer's data." 9 "In fact, it is the business model of many
information-intensive companies to draw the consumer in through the offer of one
thing and later counter the offering .... The ultimate [outcome] may not be even
be foreseeable .... , 120 Thus, as Professors Whittington and Hoofnagle argue,
once a commercial entity obtains personal information for one purpose from an
113. While Facebook allows users to format privacy settings to supposedly monitor and control disclosure of
information, Facebook data use policy states "we also put together data from the information we already have
about you and your friends .... When we get your GPS location, we put it together with other location
information we have about you (like your current city). But we only keep it until it is no longer useful to provide
you services .... We only provide data to our advertising partners or customers after we have removed your
name or any other personally identifying information from it, or have combined it with other people's data in a
way that it is no longer associated with you" and even still "for information others share about you, they control
how it is shared" and a user cannot modify the disclosure settings of others. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK
http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Apr. 18, 2013).
114. Whittington &Hoofnagle, supra note 99, at 1357.
115. Haynes, supra note 107, at 595,604-05 (discussing various websites who are less than clear in disclosure
claims).
116. Whoriskey, supra note 82.
117. Stecklow & Stone, supra note 81.
118. Whittington & Hoofnagle, supra note 99, at 1329.
119. Id. at 1341.
120. Id. at 1342.
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individual, it will use the information in violation of the privacy agreement or alter
the agreement for a new use of the information.
121
For example, in July of 2012 Instagram was a photo-sharing app with 80 million
users. 122 In September, Facebook finalized the purchase of Instagram. t23 Three
months later, Facebook and Instagram altered the Privacy and Terms of Service
(through Instagram's blog) by announcing Facebook had a right to license and sell
all public Instagram photos users had shared to anyone, and all without any notice
or payment to the user.124 Not only did this announcement contain a mandatory
arbitration clause forcing users to waive class action rights, but users had no ability
to opt out of the new change (just to leave the service, which only affected future
pictures), notwithstanding that they had provided their pictures and data under a
very different agreement. 125 While one might argue such photos were initially
voluntarily shared with Instagram, the personal data associated with the account or
photo likely was not. Yet, Instagram announced, again by blog, that it was
changing its privacy policy to share such information with third party takers,
including Facebook. 126 This move resulted in a class action lawsuit.
127
Finally, the terms of use or privacy policy documents themselves, because they
condition the use of the service on disclosure of information, can be considered
coercive under certain circumstances and, therefore, involuntary.128 Indeed, once
the entity has the users' information, the users may want to terminate the re-
121. Id. at 1349, n.73.
122: Emil Protalinski, Instagram Passes 80 Million Users, CNET (July 26, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57480931-93/instagram-passes-80-million-users/.
123. Donna Tam, Facebook Closes Instagram Deal, Welcomes Its 5B Shared Photos, CNET (Sept. 6, 2012,
8:36 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023-3-57507465-93/facebook-closes-instagram-deal-welcomes-its-5b-
shared-photos/.
124. Declan McCullagh, Instagram Says It Now Has the Right to Sell Your Photos, CNET (Dec. 17, 2012,
9:54 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57559710-38/instagram-says-it-now-has-the-right-to-sell-your-
photos/.
125. Dan Levine, Instagram Furor Triggers First Class Action Lawsuit, REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2012, 2:45 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/24/us-instagram-lawsuit-idUSBRE8BNOJI20121224.
126. Don Reisinger, Instagram to Start Sharing User Data With Facebook, CNET (Dec. 17, 2012, 8:04 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57559553-93/instagram-to-start-sharing-user-data-with-facebook.
127. Levine, supra note 125. Instagram eventually announced a retreat from the claim it could sell users'
photographs, but not all of its controversial charges. Declan McCullagh & Donna Tam, Instagram Apologizing to
Users: We Won't Sell Your Photos, CNET (Dec. 18, 2012,2:13 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10233-57559890-
93/instagram-apologizes-to-users-we-wont-sell-your-photos/.
128. For example, many of the web sites simply state they can change the terms at any time without the
consumer's permission. See e.g., YAHOO! TERMS OF SERVICE, http://info.yahoo.comlegal/us/yahoo/utosutos-
173.html (stating Yahoo! subject to the following Terms of Service ("TOS"), which may be updated by us from
time to time without notice to you); Couchsurfing Terms of Use, COUCHSURItNG INT'L, INC., https://
www.couchsurfling.org/n/terms (last visited Apr. 1, 2013); BusiNEsS TERMS OF USE (USA), SKYPE, http://
www.skype.com/en/legal/business-tou-us/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (stating that Skype reserves the right to
modify their Business Agreement at any time and may post the notice on its web site). Some sites offer broad
statements such as: "we may disclose your personal information as otherwise permitted or required by law." See,
e.g., Whittington & Hoofnagle, supra note 99, at 1360; Online Privacy Policy, ALLY FINANCIAL, http://
www.ally.com/privacy/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
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lationship. However, doing so is challenging because the entity possesses their
information and is not required to relinquish it or cease selling it. 129 Furthermore,
participation in some services are so integral to participation in society that it is
inherently unfair to condition their receipt on some forms of mandatory privacy
invasions.130 Many of these services have become the "new utility" which is so
essential that it is unreasonable to deny service.
13 1
With regard to phones and phone applications, there often is no privacy
agreement at all.1 32 "Smartphone users are all but powerless to limit the tracking.
With few exceptions, app users can't 'opt out' of phone tracking."'' 33 Yet, what is
shared, unbeknownst to the user, is the important unique device identifier. 1
34
C. The Government Obtains This Information from These Commercial Entities
With Less Than a Warrant and Probable Cause
With this massive content of personal information collected by primary and
third party takers, it is no wonder that law enforcement would seek access to this
information. As Professor Slobogin notes, "[g]overnments that want to know about
their subjects would be foolish not to take advantage of this situation, and federal
and state bodies in this country have done so with alacrity."' 135 Indeed, Professor
Ohm predicts law enforcement will soon entirely outsource surveillance to private
companies. "Police agencies will begin to abdicate their traditional role as con-
ductor of surveillance, because it will be eclipsed by the powerful new systems of
private surveillance .... who are... ungoverned by the state action requirements
of the Fourth Amendment .... ,136 The effect of collecting and aggregating this
digital information allows law enforcement to access "comprehensive dossier on
almost any adult."' 137 The American Bar Association, concerned with the fact that
"law enforcement seeking evidence of crime in records maintained by nongovern-
mental institutions is surely among the most important and common investigatory
activities" created a task force to develop Criminal Justice Standards on Law
129. Whittington & Hoofnagle, supra note 99, at 1365, 1568.
130. Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 622 (stating "the shortsighted Miller decision does not take into account the
reality that individuals need to give their information to third parties in order to participate in society"); Haynes,
supra note 107, at 619-20 (discussing such contracts as unconscionable). This is not to say all conditions of
service are coercive. Some are reasonable and necessary for legitimate and responsible business, good corporate
citizenship, or certain compliance with criminal investigations.
131. Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 622; Whittington & Hoofnagle, supra note 99, at 1365.
132. See Thurm & Kane, supra note 43.
133. FTC, MOBILE AppS FOR KIDS: DISCLOSURES STILL NOT MAKING THE GRADE (Dec. 2012), http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2012/12/121210mobilekidsappreport.pdf; Thurm & Kane, supra note 43.
134. See Thurm & Kane, supra note 43.
135. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 317
(2008).
136. Ohm, supra note 51, at 1321.
137. Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 596.
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Enforcement access to Third Party Records.' 3 8
The examples of government access to this information are several. At times, the
government relationship to the information collection is direct. For example, the
venture capital arm of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was reportedly
among the several investors placing several million dollars into such secret data
collection.139 The government has become involved in the creation of "fusion
centers," which are "an amalgamation of commercial and public sector resources
for the purpose of optimizing the collection, analysis, and sharing of information
on individuals."1 40 The government is engaged in large-scale data mining for
the purpose of obtaining information on subjects."4 ' As recently as 2008 it was
reported that the federal government was planning data mining by 52 federal
agencies, with a vast majority of these efforts "designed to obtain 'personal
data."1 42 The FBI has sought to invest in technology that will data mine social
networking and open source news websites. 1
43
The government's access also occurs indirectly when the government requests
or purchases information from primary or even third party takers. This is possible
because the entities surreptitiously collect information, create databases, and also
cater to and tailor the information to each individual government agency so as to
facilitate government use of the data. 44 This catering includes allowing the
government to prevent outside entities from knowing what or whom law enforce-
ment is researching. 
145
Some of this information is voluntarily disclosed to the public, and law
enforcement is doing what it should do in its mission-namely, to investigate
crime. Crime investigation or prevention should not remain in the twentieth
138. ABA, LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS STANDARDS 14 (2012).
139. In-Q-Tel, created by C.I.A. director George Tenet, reportedly invested approximately $30 million a year
in an Internet startup in Silicon Valley, for the purpose of "provid[ing] venture capital for data-mining
technologies that would allow the C.I.A. to monitor and profile potential terrorists as closely and carefully as
Amazon monitors and profiles potential customers." Jeffrey Rosen, Silicon Valley's Spy Game, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2002, at 46; see also, Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships
in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REv. 901, 908 (2008) (explaining "people simply do not interface with the
government in the same ways or with the same frequency as they do with the private sector" and therefore
"intelligence agencies find themselves particularly drawn to, and in some respects dependent upon, private data
resources").
140. Slobogin, supra note 135, at 318 (noting that as of 2008, thirty-eight state and local government fusion
centers existed, supported by a million dollars in federal funding).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 319; see also Elizabeth Montalbano, FBI Seeks Data-Mining App for Social Media, INFORMATION
WEEK, (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/government/security/fbi-seeks-data-mining-app-for-
social-med/232500552.
143. See Montalbano, supra note 142.
144. See Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 608, 621.
145. See Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 612. There are positive reasons not to allow this information to be
detected such as not alerting a target he is under investigation. Nonetheless, this sort of permanent cloak is an
example of the facilitating government access to privately collected information from primary and third party
takers.
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century world, as crime itself has moved into the twenty-first century.'46 However,
some investigation techniques transcend accessing information voluntarily made
public (say, by one's social networking site), 147 or disclosed to other individuals
who later shared it with law enforcement. 148 Accessing information taken secretly
by primary or third party takers is precisely this, and it is the concern of this
Article.
State governments are also actively engaging in such programs as well, due to
the vastness of the commercial entities' data and the low cost of obtaining it.
149
The result of this massive amount of information being held by the private sector
could be, as Professor Ohm predicts, an evisceration of the Fourth Amendment.
This occurs because it will be unnecessary for police to obtain a warrant to retrieve
information from a suspect which they can obtain from a private company, and the
information will be more comprehensive and accurate.1 50 Indeed, Professor
Hoofnagle has demonstrated that this is already "big business."' 5 '
This government access is only the beginning. Within the last decade, political
campaigns have become heavily involved in data mining information on voters, so
called "microtargeting."' 152 While the campaigns claim this is an effort to more
acutely target messages, the techniques used are the same as the aforemen-
tioned. 153 Acting as primary takers br through third party data mining companies,
they install cookies on individuals' computers and devices, track their moves and
those of their friends, and match that information with offline data on voter
146. See Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN (Aug. 30, 2012,
5:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-media/index.html (discuss-
ing positive ways in which police utilize social media to dismantle street gangs, interrupt criminal activity, and
discover evidence of such); Patience Wait, Police Make Wide Use of Social Tools, INFORMATION WEEK, (July 20,
1012 10:30 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/govemment/information-management/police-make-wide-use-
of-social-tools/240004077. For an excellent discussion of data mining by the Government see also Slobogin,
supra note 135.
147. See e.g., Rocco Parascandola, New York Police Department Issues First Rules for Use of Social Media
During Investigations, NEw YORK DAiLY NEwS, (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.nydailynews.conmnew-
york/new-york-police-dept-issues-rules-social-media-investigations-article-. 1157122 (detailing the NYPD's ap-
proval of investigators using social media aliases to gather evidence).
148. See United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding the defendants
"legitimate expectation of privacy ended when he disseminated posts to his 'friends' because those 'friends' were
free to use the information however they wanted-including sharing it with the Government"); Kelly, supra
note 146 (discussing a case in which a defendant's friend agreed to give police access to the defendant's private
information).
149. See Slobogin, supra note 135, at 319-20.
150. See Ohm, supra note 51, at 1321.
151. Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 599-614.
152. See e.g., Sasha Issenberg, How President Obama 's Campaign Used Big Data to Rally Voters: Part 2,
MIT TEcH. REV. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/50885 1/how-obama-wrangled-
data-to-win-his-second-term/.
153. See Singer & Duhigg, supra note 60 (discussing the use of data tracking programs by the 2012
Presidential campaigns).
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:341
registration polls. 154 One company claims to have matched over 600 million
cookies with 250 million voters. 155 Future agreements with AT&T and other
companies will expand this tracking to individuals' mobile phone devices and IP
addresses on television sets.1
56
While this may seem like nothing more than effective campaign tactics, it is
arguably different. It is different because at the end of the election, one candidate
wins and becomes the government. Thus, in the hands of the government flows a
vast amount of information about individuals including their preferences, chari-
table donations, associates, email addresses, political preferences, voter registra-
tion information, etc. 157 Most, if not all, was obtained involuntarily and is now in
the hands of the government.' 58 While the campaigns claim this is all done
anonymously,159 these claims are eerily similar to those of the companies and
advertisers who use this technology, and they are equally as hollow, as companies
concede that personal information is sent to campaigns that possess the email
addresses of individuals. 160 For example, while companies must acknowledge that
this type of work is being done for campaigns, they often refuse to disclose exactly
which campaigns are clients. Similarly, the campaigns are often less than clear as
to what is collected, how it is done, or who is doing the collection. 1
61
154. See Issenberg, supra note 152; Singer & Duhigg, supra note 60 (reporting that Obama and Romney
campaigns had more tracking devices than some major retailers, as many as ninety-seven combined); Tanzina
Vega, Online Data Helping Campaigns Customize Ads, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/28/us/politics/tracking-clicks-online-to-try-to-sway-voters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
155. See Allison Brennan, Microtargeting: How Campaigns Know You Better Than You Know Yourself,
CNN (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com2012/11/05/politics/voters-microtargeting.
156. See id.
157. See Singer & Duhigg, supra note 60 (reporting campaigns marry information third party trackers obtain
about people with information they have collected about voters including political links shared on social
networks); Brennan, supra note 154 (reporting that data companies collect or purchase personal information and
connect it with public available voter rolls); Vega, supra note 153.
158. Lois Beckett, How Microsoft and Yahoo Are Selling Politicians Access to You, PROPUBLICA (June 11,
2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-microsoft-and-yahoo-are-selling-politicians-access-to-
you (reporting Microsoft and Yahoo selling browsing information to campaigns without notice to their
customers). As this article was going to press, revelations emerged concerning federal government programs
collecting records and data regarding foreign nationals and possibly American citizens. Victor Luckerson, Prism
By the Numbers: A Guide to the Government's Secret Internet Data Mining Program, TIME, June 6, 2013
http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/06/06/prism-by-the-numbers-a-guide-to-the-governments-secret-internet-
data-mining-program/. The complete contours of the programs remain to be learned. Although this appears to be
beyond the scope of this article as it suggests programs related to national security, as opposed to purely criminal
investigations, the limited public reaction further illustrates that the public has been conditioned by private
industry to have a decreased sense of privacy. Adam Nagourney, In U.S. News of Surveillance Effort is Met With
Some Concern But Little Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/us/many-
ameicans-appear-resigned-to-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
159. Brennan, supra note 155.
160. See Singer & Duhigg, supra note 50.
161. Beckett, supra note 158. One of the reasons the data collection is possible is that no single federal law
comprehensively protects private information held by private sector. Congress has regulated this information on a
sector-by-sector basis and, as a result, information such as private health information and video game rentals are
regulated but other information, such as credit reporting, is not. See also STEVENs, supra note 27, at 7 (explaining
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II. COMMERCIAL CONDITIONING HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL EFFECT
Some scholars and courts have wrestled with the challenging reality that
government access to third party information poses to the Fourth Amendment.
This scholarship is essential to comprehending the implications of this new
world order. However, this Article suggests the problem is far more upstream
than the government's access to the information. The more central threat to the
Fourth Amendment is the commercial conditioning of individuals. It affronts
the Fourth Amendment protections in two fundamental ways. First, it precludes
individuals from establishing an expectation of privacy by eviscerating each prong
of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Second, this taking and possessing
of the information affords the government the ability hide behind third parties
(given the Third Party Disclosure Rule). While that may be a valid argument in the
context of a voluntary disclosure of information to the public, it cannot be valid
when the information is taken from the individual rather than consciously and
voluntarily shared.
A. Commercial Conditioning Precludes the Ability to Establish an
Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy. The protections of the
Fourth Amendment are triggered in two instances: first, when the government is
involved in a search or an examination of an area in which one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy; or second, when the government engages in a physical
trespass of a constitutionally protected area while it is seeking information. 162 The
first instance, the Katz test, is the relevant test for the modem electronic surveil-
lance at issue in this Article. 1
63
As to the former, in order to obtain Fourth Amendment protections, a court
must find that (1) the individual exhibited an actual expectation of privacy in the
location searched (subjective prong) and (2) that expectation is one that society
is prepared to accept as reasonable (objective prong).' 64 In Smith v. Maryland,
the Court acknowledged "[s]ituations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz'
two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment
that personal information privacy is regulated by "a patchwork" of federal and state laws). For a comprehensive
discussion of many relevant statutes and the ability of the government to access the information upon request see
Hoofnagle, supra note 56.
162. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (explaining that "the Katz reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test") (emphasis added);
Florida v. Jardines, 2013 WL 1196577 (2013).
163. Id. at 953 (finding that "[slituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis").
164. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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protection.' 65 Society, through commercial conditioning has reached such a
point.
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court referenced circumstances "where an individu-
al's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-
recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms," and concluded that when such has
occurred, "subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was."' t 6 6 While the
Court correctly acknowledged the evisceration of the subjective expectation of
privacy would mean the traditional Katz analysis was no longer valid, the Court
incorrectly assumed the source of such a threat would be the government.
Indeed, individuals have been conditioned to believe they do not have expectations
of privacy. It has been accomplished, not by the government, but by private
entities.
This is demonstrated by reference to the very examples of conditioning
discussed in Smith. These include: "if the Government were suddenly to announce
on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to war-
rantless entry," and "if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this
Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously moni-
toring his telephone conversations ....,,167 The Court recognized that were
these to occur, the individual no longer entertained an actual expectation of
privacy t68 and the two-pronged Katz analysis would fail. Katz is quite clear;
not only must an individual claim he expected privacy, he must have demonstrated
such. 16 9 As Professor Clancy notes, there must be an external or proactive act
on the part of the individual to conclusively show he had such an expectation.
170
It may be Katz's closing the door to the phone booth,' 7 1 the placing of personal
items in a suitcase, 172 or the sealing of an envelope, 173 but it must be demonstrated.
The Court explicitly recognized, therefore, that Fourth Amendment rights
should not be curtailed by conditioning individuals to believe they are under
165. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). In Smith, the Court held no search occurred when a
telephone company, acting at the request of the police, placed a pen register on Smith's phone, thereby confirming
that he was the person placing harassing phone calls to the victim. Id. at 742.
166. Id. at 740 n.5.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are
not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited') (emphasis added).
170. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a
Primer, 75 Miss. L.J. 193, 220-22 (2005).
171. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
172. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
173. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
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intrusive or constant surveillance. 174 Doing so precludes individuals from establish-
ing they have been subjected to a search. Therefore, it precludes them from Fourth
Amendment protections. It is important to distinguish here between the general
and the specific. Individuals are aware in general that commercial entities are
surveilling and tracking them. They learn it from unsolicited emails, unrequested
advertisements, and references to prior purchases. Thus, commercial conditioning
occurs in a general sense because individuals know in general they are being
tracked. In a specific sense, however, they did not know exactly who took their
information or when their information was taken. This also decreases privacy
expectations because they cannot register an objection to the specific taking to
demonstrate their privacy expectations.
When commercial entities take information from individuals without their
knowledge, by placing devices on their computers to track where they move
their "mouses" on web pages, or by engaging in an inspection of the contents of
email before it even arrives at the box of the recipients, individuals never have
the opportunity to demonstrate an expectation of privacy in this information.
If an individual cannot have such an opportunity, then she can never establish a
subjective expectation of privacy and, therefore, can never attain Fourth Amend-
ment protections when the government subsequently obtains the information.
Commercial conditioning has a similar effect on the objective prong of the test.
This effect exceeds what is done on the individual level. This ubiquitous presence
of surveillance, combined with the individual knowledge that there is nothing one
can do to prevent it, leads society to feel there is no actual privacy. Thus, there is no
privacy expectation one could conclude society would find reasonable. This notion
that people feel little if anything is private is apparent. 175 As Professor Brenner
notes, a significant effect of this ubiquitous surveillance
has been a serious reduction in an individual's rights and expectations of
privacy. It has become increasingly common for data about transactions and
ourselves (Data) to be collected and retained by third parties (Collectors) who
often disclose more intimate details of our lives and lifestyles than would
have ever been imaginable or acceptable just a decade ago. In turn, this
174. One could argue not all of society understands the level of surveillance and, therefore, is conditioned to
believe there is no privacy. As Professor Slobogin has noted, it is difficult to establish actual expectations of
society. Nonetheless, under either circumstance, the first prong is impossible to establish. Either the individual
believes nothing is private, and fails to claim privacy, or the individual is unaware of the data collection so cannot
demonstrate a privacy expectation. Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and
Permitted By Society," 52 DuKE L.J. 727 (1993).
175. Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, in Ninth Annual
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), at 3 (2010) (concluding that individuals' ability to
publish their information increases their comfort level in privacy and paradoxically leads them to share more such
information), http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Misplaced-Confidences-acquisti-
FPF.pdf; Slobogin, supra note 135 at 336; see also, Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 616 (noting that American
reaction to Choicepoint selling data to the government is less intense than in other countries).
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retention creates an unprecedented risk that a local, state, or federal govern-
ment (Government) can obtain data, without the need for a warrant, Data about
individuals (Consumers) to which it has never had access.
176
As the practice becomes more common and more challenging for individuals to
detect and stop, society risks becoming resigned to a lack of privacy--or
"conditioned" to it.
B. Commercial Conditioning Further Eviscerates the Fourth Amendment By
Providing the Government a Path Around Fourth Amendment Protections
The final way in which commercial conditioning has weakened Fourth
Amendment protections is the imprecise invocation of the Third Party doctrine.
This doctrine is generally cited for the proposition that information obtained by
the government from the hands of a third party is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.' 77 As will be discussed infra, such a reading of the doctrine is
oversimplified. 178 Nonetheless, this broad invocation of the doctrine can lead only
to one conclusion: commercial conditioning makes it impossible to gain the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Professor Ohm convincingly argues that the
surveillance of individuals by private entities has done "something important that
no FBI lab could ever hope to do-convince the surveillance targets of the world to
consensually adopt their surveillance technologies, acting as a neat end-around
circumventing the Fourth Amendment." 
179
This is the additional method by which commercial conditioning deteriorates
Fourth Amendment protections. Commercial entities defend their actions in part
based on the fact they are not the government. In doing so they distort the
protections the Constitution provides. That is to say, even when an individual can
establish information has been taken without her knowledge or voluntary consent
by the entity and delivered to the government, these commercial entities reject the
claim of privacy invasion by noting the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
them. Doing so further conditions individuals to believe there is nothing they can
do to prevent the government from obtaining this information.' 80
176. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 212.
177. The Third Party Doctrine asserts that the Fourth Amendment allows "the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities .... United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
178. See infra, Part IV (attempting to refocus the broad language of the Court in Miller and subsequent
interpretations of the Third Party Doctrine to simply embrace voluntary consent to third party use of private
information).
179. Ohm, supra note 51, at 1322; see also Slobogin, supra note 135, at 341 (asserting "the Supreme Court's
current hands-off approach to record searches cannot justifiably be applied to data mining if societal views about
privacy expectations are taken seriously").
180. As previously mentioned, I have argued elsewhere that statutory protection from the commercial removal
of this information would protect individuals from the initial privacy invasion. However, in the absence of such
congressional action, this use of constitutional jurisprudence remains an option.
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By stripping individuals of their ability to demonstrate their subjective ex-
pectation of privacy, and by stripping society of its ability to find an expecta-
tion reasonable, commercial entities have become the "influence alien to Fourth
Amendment freedoms" of which the Court warned. Just as the Court has forbidden
the Government from conditioning society to believe it has no privacy, the Court
should preclude the government from taking advantage of commercial entities'
actions by requiring Fourth Amendment protections to adhere to this information
when the government seeks to access it. The next Part of this Article will discuss
how this can be done.
III. TECHNOLOGY AND THE FouRTH AMENDMENT-A VEXING BUT NOT NOVEL ISSUE
Scholars, the Court, and individual justices have openly raised this issue. The
Court has at times simply raised it and left it unresolved. '81 Scholars, on the other
hand, have explored some aspects and suggested solutions. This rich body of work
reminds one of the analyses of democracy and its flaws: scholarship and the media
often put forth excellent criticisms of the current system, but finding a workable
and superior alternative is challenging. A review of some current scholarship, the
Court's opinions, and Justices' individual commentaries concerning technology
reveals three basic points. First, there is a recognition that technological advances
can affect Fourth Amendment conceptions. Second, it is understood that these
realities call for alterations to the definition of what the Fourth Amendment
protects. Third, notwithstanding this agreement, identifying and implementing a
new framework has been somewhat elusive.
Recently, many scholars have struggled with the implications of rapidly ad-
vancing technologies.' 82 My work attempts to build on these well-considered
181. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that "[in circumstances
involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative"); City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (stating that "[t]he Court must proceed with care when considering
the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment .... The judiciary
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear").
182. Although much of the dialog is fairly recent, others such as Christopher Slobogin, Ric Simmons, and
Thomas Clancy have been exploring this issue for some time. Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and
the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. RE.
1393, 1394 (2002) (discussing how "the dissenters in Kyllo rightly pointed out, varying Fourth Amendment
regulation of technology on the prevalence of that technology is troublesome, -because 'the threat to privacy will
grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available"'); Christopher
Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 Miss. L.J. 139 (2005) (voicing concern "that law
enforcement officials can, perfectly legally, gain access" to personal information regarding finances, health,
purchases, housing and activities "much more easily than they can search our houses or even our cars"); Ric
Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology's Effect on Privacy and Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531 (2007) (examining "the ways in which new
technology has enhanced our privacy," and "the effect of new technology on government surveillance .... ); see
Clancy, supra note 170, at 195 (addressing the implications of computer data and storage on the Fourth
Amendment). This is by no means an exhaustive list.
2013]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
approaches. However, as will be discussed, the commercial conditioning proposal
suggests a closer reading of the history of the voluntariness component of both the
reasonable expectation of privacy test and the third party doctrine.
The scholarship in this area is diverse in some respects, but uniform in others.
Some propose a radical rethinking of Fourth Amendment doctrine, while others
suggest a more incremental approach.183 Thomas Clancy offers a compelling case
that the Court's and scholars' focus on privacy as the interest protected by the
Fourth Amendment is misplaced, and that the right protected is the right to be
secure from government intervention. 184 In other words, individuals have the right
to exclude the government from invading certain aspects of their lives.'85 While
discussing the recent resurgence of property as a Fourth Amendment concept in
Jones, Professor Clancy astutely observes this concept of property is now playing
a different role than in the past.
[P]rior to Katz, property was viewed as a protected interest; in Katz that view
was rhetorically rejected in favor of privacy as a centralizing principle. How-
ever, in the wake of Katz, the Court quickly returned property to a central role
but that role was often obscured by subsuming property into the reasonable
expectation of privacy formula. Hence, a property right was a manner in which
a person was said to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Scalia, in
Jones returned to the pre-Katz view: property is an independent protected
right .... 186
In this approach which challenges privacy as the Fourth Amendment's target right,
Professor Clancy incisively observes the right of security has been confused with
the reason for the right to be secure: privacy.187
In his analysis, Professor Clancy confirms a fundamental aspect of the commer-
cial conditioning approach: there is a value in the demonstration of privacy. While
Professor Clancy does not support the Katz test, he argues effectively that in this
technological age the right to exclude the government must be exercised, and no
Fourth Amendment protection is triggered if an individual does not take steps to
exclude the government. Commercial conditioning also asserts there is indeed a
value to the demonstration of a privacy expectation. It agrees the Fourth Amend-
ment should not necessarily apply to information publicly and voluntarily dis-
closed by individuals. However, it recognizes that due to commercial conditioning,
no opportunity exists for individuals to demonstrate their privacy. Thus, the current
test will always fail to find Fourth Amendment protection.
183. Those theories discussed herein are not intended to be an exhaustive list, but are offered as examples of
some varying approaches.
184. Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability in the 21st Century,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303, 316 (2012).
185. Id. at 318.
186. Id. at 310.
187. Id. at 316.
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Professor Ohm agrees with Professor Clancy that the Fourth Amendment
seeks to ensure liberty, and that privacy is a proxy for this value. 188 However, he
also recognizes that notwithstanding the many critics of the Katz test, no workable
new test has been offered. 189 Professor Henderson openly acknowledges the
challenges inherit in replacing the Katz test, noting that he at first offered a nine
factor test which he has now been able to modify to a more workable four factor
analysis.190 Professor Slobogin argues for a proportionality principle based ap-
proach.' 91
More recently, some scholarship observes the phenomenon discussed in commer-
cial conditioning, i.e. there is a fundamental shift in privacy due to technology.
Professor Ohm argues minor changes to the Third Party doctrine are insufficient to
address this changing reality, because such alterations may only address govern-
ment surveillance, and will do nothing if no privacy exists at all. 192 Professor
Brenner notes "Fourth Amendment protection should not vanish simply because
advances in technology permit, and to a certain extent make unavoidable, massive
data collection and mining that expose consumers to the enhanced risks of a
Collector's breach of trust." '93
The Court's jurisprudence has long recognized technology affects Fourth
Amendment conceptions. Katz itself was driven in part by the increasing use of the
telephone for communication. 194 The Court has narrowed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment due to technological changes such as the rise of air travel.
1 95
It has also enhanced protections when faced with government use of technology
to conduct surveillance of the home. 196 More recently, the Court has become
188. Ohm, supra note 136, at 1312.
189. Id. at 1309,1311-13.
190. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information,
Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 975, 988 (2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REv. 507
(2005); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and
Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. Rev. 373, 423
(2006).
191. Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle,
72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1053, 1055 (1998).
192. Ohm, supra note 51, at 1331.
193. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 214.
194. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
195. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding some surveillance from a helicopter does not violate
the reasonable expectation of privacy); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding that observation
with the naked eye from commercial flight does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy).
196. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,953 (2012) (acknowledging "we do not make trespass the exclusive
test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject
to Katz analysis") (emphasis in original); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding when
"Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search ....').
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hesitant to alter fundamental approaches, 197 recognizing the "judiciary risks error
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become clear."' 98 This hesitation to alter
fundamental aspects of the Fourth Amendment was on display in the open ar-
gument between some justices in Jones. While each opinion reflected recognition
that technology was affecting privacy, each suggested a different solution. Justice
Scalia and the majority proposed a return to a physical trespass approach, Justice
Alito suggested a more incremental application of Katz but called for a legislative
solution, and Justice Sotomayor more aggressively suggested an abandonment of
the Third Party doctrine.1 99
Individual justices have recognized the effect of technology on Fourth Amend-
ment conceptions. As far back as 1890 in their seminal article, The Right To
Privacy, Warren and future Justice Brandeis argued for a redefinition of privacy
because of the development of invasive technologies.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which
must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the in-
dividual.., the right "to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs and news-
paper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life;
and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that
"what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." 200
In their call for a right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis clearly recognized not
only that technology alters realities, but that its ability to allow deep invasions of
privacy result in pain for individuals.20'
Justice Brandeis continued this understanding of the effect of technology on
privacy throughout his career, noting:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become avail-
able to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
197. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (observing "Rapid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society
accepts as proper behavior.").
198. Id. (declining to rule on whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages).
199. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (applying an 18th-century guarantee against trespassory unreasonable searches,
"which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection") (emphasis in original); id. at 964
(Alito, J., concurring) (arguing a "legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way"); id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (arguing third party disclosure doctrine is "ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks").
200. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890) (citations
omitted).
201. Id. at 196 (declaring that "modem enterprise and invention have, through invasion upon his privacy,
subjected [man] to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury").
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Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to
obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.202
Justice Brandeis offered more than just a Pavlovian resistance to techno-
logical surveillance. Rather, he understood the basic protection from government
intrusion into the personal life the Fourth Amendment offered.20 3 Indeed, as
Professor Brenner notes, the "eventual adoption by virtually every U.S. state of the
Warren-Brandeis analysis demonstrates that such a redefinition was an essential
consequence of the evolution of these particular technologies. ' 2°
More recently, Justices Sotomayor and Alito openly discussed not only tech-
nology's effect on privacy in general, but on the expectation of privacy analysis
specifically. For Justice Sotomayor, the concern is not only the collection of the
data, but the aggregation of the data, and the potential for government abuse:
IT]he Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private
aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that... making
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discre-
tion, chooses to track-may "alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.
20
5
Justice Sotomayor would consider the effects on speech of the collection of data
as well as its aggregation when evaluating the existence of a reasonable societal
expectation of privacy.206 This would, in turn, lead to asking "whether people
reasonably expect that their [activities] will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."207
IV. THE PROPOSAL: LIMIT THE EFFECT OF COMMERCIAL CONDITIONING By APPLYING
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS TO THIS INFORMATION
This Article shares the recognition that technology affects Fourth Amendment
protections, but shifts the issue away from a focus on government surveillance.
Commercial conditioning has eroded Fourth Amendment protections, and a
judicial solution focused on this central problem is needed.
Identifying the current difficulty and offering a superior solution are two dis-
tinct endeavors, and the latter proves to be imperfect no matter what solution is
202. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
203. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 200, at 220 (noting the law recognizes a man's house is his castle and
asking "[sihall the courts thus close the front entrance... and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity?").
204. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 218-19.
205. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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proposed. This Article proposes neither a radically new Constitutional test for
privacy or security, nor does it accept the status quo. In the absence of a more
practical legislative solution, courts must address commercial conditioning.2 °8 Our
jurisprudence should reflect the kind of privacy promised by the Fourth Amend-
ment.
This proposal has some defining components. First, it does not cover all private
information. Instead, it focuses on a narrow portion of the digital dossier: in-
formation taken from individuals involuntarily. Next, rather than a new test, this
Article proposes courts reinvigorate what is already present in Fourth Amendment
protections: the concept of voluntariness.
By reinvigorating voluntariness into the search jurisprudence and the Third
Party doctrine, this proposal suggests only a minor adjustment in current law.
Moreover, it establishes state action not at the initial collection, but instead at the
time the state seeks to access the information from the taker. When the govern-
ment, in a criminal investigation, obtains information that was taken involuntarily
through commercial conditioning (either unknowingly or without meaningful
voluntary consent), it must be considered a search by the government, and some
Fourth Amendment protections apply. The government should be required to
comply with some form of procedural protections.2 °9
A. The Purpose of the Fourth Amendment Includes an Element of Voluntariness
in Information Disclosure
Although the Founders were concerned with the government engaging in
abusive home searches, it has long been understood that the Fourth Amendment's
protections encompass more majestic concerns as well. "It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offence .... ,,210 Rather, the Founders noted the essence of the offense was the
invasion into one's personal and private rights.21
Central, although not exclusive, to one's personal and private life is one's
papers. Quoting from Lord Camden's condemnation of general warrants, the Court
has noted "papers" are the owner's "dearest property., 21 2 Eighteenth century
general warrants aimed at the "discovery ... of books and papers that might be
used to convict their owner[s]" were certainly "in the minds of those who framed
208. Mary Leary, supra note 2, at 347.
209. These procedural protections do not necessarily mean probable cause. A full warrant is not required for
every government request of information. Modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that the "central
inquiry" of the Amendment is reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Probable cause has been seen as a
flexible concept in which courts consider the nature of the inquiry and balance the intrusion against the
government's justification. E.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1, Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523
(1967). This balance is for courts to determine.
210. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 627-28.
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the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently
explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures. 21 3
The concern was arguably more specific than that. Lord Camden in 1765, and
the Court in 1886, were not only concerned with access to one's personal papers,
but specifically with a coercive removal of said papers. "[A]ny forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used
as evidence to convict him of crime... is within the condemnation of [Lord
Camden] ... [and is] the true doctrine on the subject of searches and sei-
zures .. .214
Boyd is an early comprehensive treatment of the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment, and it gave the Fourth Amendment a decidedly liberal interpretation-
focusing on property rights as those which define the boundary between reason-
able and unreasonable searches and seizures. Although Olmstead v. United States
largely undercut Boyd by limiting Fourth Amendment protections to papers,
houses, and effects, Katz reversed that aspect of Olmstead and found intangible
conversations also protected by the Fourth Amendment.21 5 In so doing, the Court
made some important observations. First, government access to certain intangibles
such as thoughts, conversations, or actions done in private are apparently an
extension of the person. Second, it matters whether the person voluntarily shared
the information contained in the tangible and intangible sources, or whether
another entity simply took information.
This is consistent with Warren and Brandeis' approach in which they discussed
as central to the concept of privacy the right to freely determine what information
about oneself is shared. "The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others. 21 6 While one might be tempted to argue this
does not extend to transactional information on the Internet, Warren and Brandeis
were clear that the right to limit the publication of such information "does not
depend upon the particular method of expression. 21 7 They specifically demanded
that any individual consent to disclosure of information he deems private. "[T]he
individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the
public. No other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his
consent.,2' 8 They specifically state the right ends only when the individual himself
publishes the information or it is done by a third party with the consent of the
213. Id. 625-27.
214. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
215. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466
(1928).
216. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 200, at 198.
217. Id. at 198-99.
218. Id. at 199.
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Not only was the idea of consent to publication a component of the early
understanding of the Fourth Amendment protections, but some have written the
Amendment also has roots in concerns regarding private intrusion as well.
Professor Brenner argues the Fourth Amendment's origin was initially prompted
by English laws concerned with trespass from private entities. 2
Whether one's touchstone for the Fourth Amendment is property as in Boyd,22'
privacy as in Katz, or security as argued by recent scholars,222 the individual
retains the autonomy to decide what is private (or secure) and what is public and
unprotected. Katz's use of the subjective prong speaks to the importance of the
individual determining what is private.223 Indeed, "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 2 24 Thus, meaningful
voluntary consent to disclose information is relevant to the privacy inquiry.225
B. This Re-Invocation of the Voluntariness Aspect of Fourth Amendment
Protections is also Consistent with the Third Party Doctrine
The Third Party doctrine (and to a lesser degree, the Assumption of Risk
doctrine) as they are currently understood, may at first appear to preclude this
proposed solution.226 It is such an obstacle that many scholars and judges,
219. See id. at 218 (asserting that "[t]he right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the
individual, or with his consent").
220. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 234-37 (noting that fifteenth century kings and parliaments began
authorizing trade guilds to search others' workmanship, a practice which was followed by star chamber courts
authorizing searches directed at individuals for libel, and finally, general warrants).
221. Jones also invoked property as a touchstone. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012)
(stating that under Katz alleged Fourth Amendment seizures must be placed in reference to concepts of real or
personal property or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society).
222. Professor Clancy's approach, which abandons privacy as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment in
exchange for security, requires an individual to take steps to exclude the government "consistent with the
Supreme Court's view that voluntary exposure to the public eliminates Fourth Amendment protection." Clancy,
supra note 184, at 320.
223. That is not to say the reasonable expectation test is subjective. While the individual must demonstrate a
subjective expectation of privacy, such is necessary but not sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation.
224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
225. A voluntariness framework is not without drawbacks. Voluntariness analysis is not a bright line test, to be
sure. While ambiguities will occur, it is a superior analysis than the current approach, which leaves all information
obtained by primary or third party takers unprotected.
226. These doctrines are often treated synonymously. Although related, they are distinct. Ten years before the
articulation of the Third Party doctrine, the Court held in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), that
statements of the defendant made to a government informant were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. In so
doing the Court asserted that the defendant "assumed the risk" that any information gleaned would be shared with
the authorities. Therefore, the assumption of risk doctrine technically applies to what individuals disclose to other
people. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), are the
cases which are considered to be the origination of the Third Party doctrine. Their logic embraced the assumption
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including most recently Justice Sotomayor, have questioned the Third Party
doctrine's utility in today's age of information exchange:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people revbal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial
or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and
the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.
227
However, a close examination of this doctrine indicates an inherent voluntary
consent aspect to it. By reinvigorating the voluntariness component, such a radical
step of eliminating the Third Party doctrine could be unnecessary.
The most commonly cited description of the Third Party doctrine is the fol-
lowing quote from United States v. Miller, in which the Court ruled the defendant
possessed no Fourth Amendment interest in bank records the government obtained
through a subpoena.228
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.2 29
This is admittedly language of breadth. However, the focus on this one sentence
in Miller, so often repeated in later cases as the complete Third Party doctrine,
seems to be an overly broad view of the doctrine itself or, at least, its original
intent. The Third Party doctrine can be understood to contain an implied require-
ment of voluntary consent 230 to disclosure of information. This is supported by
Miller factually and legally.
Factually, Miller addressed information the defendant was completely aware he
of risk analysis, but embarked on a slightly different approach addressing information individuals disclose to
other entities. E.g., Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1100 (2006).
227. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
228. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
229. Id. at 443.
230. Professor Kerr, in his defense of the Third Party doctrine, has argued even further that the doctrine should
be understood as a consent doctrine. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561,
565 (2009). But see Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine,
96 IowA L. REv. BULL. 39, 44 (2011) (arguing that the Third Party doctrine has been unpopular as state
constitutional law and its rationale cannot keep pace with technological change). While this Article does not
embrace the doctrine with the same vigor, it is worth noting other scholars have recognized an even more
expanded understanding of voluntary consent within its meaning.
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shared because he affirmatively and voluntarily did so. The Court focused its
assessment on the lack of a legitimate expectation of privacy in "original checks
and deposit slips" since
[t]he checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments
to be used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained... con-
tain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.231
These types of documents-written checks or deposit slips-have a knowing
and voluntary aspect to them. The consumer must physically fill them out, sign
them, hand them to a person (or today put them in a machine). The consumer
knows a person must eventually review the document because it is a necessary
record for the transaction. Indeed, the consumer himself receives a receipt and later
a statement documenting the transaction. The consumer wants this record created
in order to establish that he made the deposit or withdrawal. At the time of the
disclosure, the consumer possesses two critical pieces of information. He knows
not only that the information is being shared but that the content of the shared
information because he himself disclosed it.
This is distinct from the knowledge a consumer has when a primary taker or
third party taker installs a super beacon on her computer. The consumer knows
neither the beacon is retrieving information from her computer nor the content of
the information obtained.
The Miller legal analysis also demonstrates a voluntary component as it
specifically mentions this information is not protected because it was "voluntarily
conveyed" to the third party.232 This is entirely different from the information
taken from consumers at issue in this Article, i.e., information taken by the primary
party without obtaining meaningful consent or even without informing the
consumer or information taken from the consumer by third party takers unknown
to him. As Justice Sotomayor observes,
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless
disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the
last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they can
attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurispru-
233dence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.
While Justice Sotomayor suggests a reevaluation of the Third Party doctrine in
the "digital age," such a drastic approach may not be necessary if the doctrine were
returned to its original scope: a doctrine that announces a lack of protection for
information knowingly and voluntarily disclosed to the public.
231. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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The doctrine's difficulty in adapting to modem times is grounded in its
overbroad interpretation, and results in equally overbroad power by the police to
invade privacy. Professor Brenner has observed the current understanding of the
related Assumption of Risk doctrine is similarly flawed. She argues that it too
imprecisely equates the transmittal of data with voluntary disclosure of informa-
tion to the public.234 The result, as Professor Slobogin vividly observes, is an
ability by the government to circumvent the Fourth Amendment by utilizing
private sources.
The implications of Miller and Smith for data mining are fairly clear. These
cases stand for the proposition that the government can obtain information
about us from third parties without worrying about the Fourth Amend-
ment .... Miller itself relied to some extent on the fact that Miller had
"voluntarily" provided his financial information to the bank, leaving open the
possibility that situations involving inadvertent disclosure could produce a
different result.
235
Miller cites to Hoffa, Katz, and White as supporting this analysis, injecting the
assumption of risk approach into the Third Party doctrine. 36 The citation to these
cases further confirms the presence of a voluntary consent aspect to both doctrines.
In Hoffa, the Court found no Fourth Amendment protection for conversations that
the defendant shared with an informant. The Court observed that the reason for this
holding was "every conversation which he [the informant] heard was either
directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence. 237 Although the Court
held the defendant cannot claim a privacy interest based on the "wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it," central to that conclusion was the voluntary nature of the
disclosure. In Hoffa, as in Miller, the defendant possessed those two critical pieces
of information; he knew both that he was disclosing information and the content of
that information. This is distinct from information taken by commercial entities
without the consumer's knowledge or consent.
Miller also referred to Katz for its articulation of the Third Party doctrine, and
Katz supports a re-insertion of a requirement of knowing and voluntary consent to
disclosure. Katz states explicitly "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public.., is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection., 238 Katz shared
information with the person on the other end of his telephone call. As in Hoffa, had
the other participant shared that information with the police or anyone else, Katz
234. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 246.
235. Slobogin, supra note 135, at 330.
236. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02
(1966)) (agreeing there is no Fourth Amendment violation "unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy").
237. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (emphasis added).
238. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (finding personal checks
exposed to a bank and its employees does not retain a defendant's justifiable right to privacy).
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would have no Fourth Amendment claim because he had assumed the risk this
would happen. He knew he was disclosing information to the other participant of
the conversation, and he knew the content of that information. However, the Katz
Court did not find this meant he risked a third party (in this case the government)
taking the information from him without his knowledge or consent. That was not
among the risks he assumed, nor did his disclosure of the information function as
information "exposed to the public."
A case frequently associated with Miller for the Third Party doctrine is Smith v.
Maryland,239 in which the Court held people do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the numbers that they dial into their telephones. The Court further
held the use by the Government of a pen trap and trace device, therefore, did not
demand Fourth Amendment protection. Central to the Court's analysis was the fact
that, as the majority saw it, people "know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company ... and that the phone company does in fact
record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes., 240 Not only
was it critical that the defendant's disclosure was somewhat knowing, it was also
made using free will. "[A] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. 24 1
This division between what is protected by the Fourth Amendment and what is
not is of course somewhat unclear, but part of this fault line appears to include
knowing information is being revealed, as well as knowing the content of said
information. Professor Ohm describes the development of the Fourth Amendment
in two camps, with the "assumption of risk" doctrine of Miller, Hoffa, and Smith,
and the "knowing exposure rule" reflected in Katz, Knotts, Dow, and Ciraolo.242
This is not only an accurate description of the body of law, but underscores the
awareness requirement embedded in the Third Party doctrine. In the assumption of
risk cases, one is subjectively aware of the risk the bank teller or phone operator
will share the exchanged information. In the Third Party cases that find no
expectation of privacy, one knows at least that he has exchanged information
available for the government to collect because of his own voluntary and knowing
acts. This framework seems fair to the consumer regarding information the
consumer directly disclosed knowingly to the primary party. However, it does not
seem fair when the consumer does not know what information the taker is
collecting or even that it is actually collecting it. It is even more nefarious when
one is unaware of the existence of the third party taker let alone that it is taking
information.
Another aspect of this voluntary exposure is the purpose of the information
exchange. Users understand the primary party needs the information for the
239. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-43 (1979).
240. Id. at 743.
241. Id. at 743-44.
242. Ohm, supra note 51, at 1326-28.
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functionality of the service they are obtaining. That is consent. However, consent
can be for a limited purpose. Users do not necessarily consent to the use of that
information for any purpose, such as collection and aggregation.
C. This Proposal is Also Consistent with the Requirement of State Action
A simple response to commercial conditioning could be to call for the illegality
of data collection. This Article does not do so as its focus is not data mining per se.
Rather, this Article seeks to highlight insidious effects of commercial conditioning
on Fourth Amendment protections. As a solution to these detrimental effects, this
proposal focuses on the narrow subset of information that is taken from individuals
without voluntary consent. When the government seeks to access this information
from either primary or third party takers, this Article proposes it must comply with
the procedural requirements of the Fourth Amendment.243 The government should
not be allowed to hide behind the Third Party doctrine to prevent this procedural
protection, notwithstanding that the initial collection was done by a private entity.
That the Fourth Amendment was created as a limit on government invasions of
privacy, as opposed to invasions by private citizens, there can be no doubt. 24
Therefore, when a private entity "unconnected with the government" wrongfully
takes information from an individual and the government lacks any knowledge of
the seizure, no Fourth Amendment violation occurs.24 5 While this may be reason-
able in an isolated incident, such as a confidential informant offering a tip to the
police, this narrow timeframe of state action is too limiting. The state action occurs
when the state contacts the primary or third party taker for the information. The
Fourth Amendment is intended to protect individuals from unreasonable searches
and seizures. If it would be unreasonable for the government to obtain it from a
suspect's effects directly, it is just as unreasonable when the government obtains it
from the entity whose business it is to take such information from the suspect and
sell it.
Commercial conditioning is distinct from a confidential informant. It is not an
isolated incident caused by an individual, as is the case with an informant's tip. As
discussed supra, the government benefits from the long term collection and
aggregation of data by access to it, and at times even purchasing it or financially
investing in its collection. 46 Justice Brandeis recognized:
243. Of course, courts may determine more specific procedural requirements on a situation by situation basis
when balancing the level of intrusion and governmental interests involved. See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1968).
244. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (noting the Fourth Amendment's "origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies"); Barnes v. United States, 373 F2d 517, 517 (5th Cir.
1967) (holding the Fourth Amendment only proscribes government action).
245. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475-76.
246. See supra Part I (discussing, for example, the increased government use of computer data to thwart
terrorism).
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[One] cannot believe that action of a public official is necessarily lawful,
because it does not violate constitutional prohibitions and because the same
result might have been attained by other and proper means. At the foundation
of our civil liberty lies the principle which denies to government officials an
exceptional position before the law .... Respect for the law will not be
advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which shock the common
man's sense of decency and fair play.
247
As discussed supra, this is third method through which commercial con-
ditioning erodes Fourth Amendment protections. Commercial entities take informa-
tion without knowledge or meaningful voluntary consent. When the entities are
criticized, they respond that their activity is permissible because these entities are
not the state. Then they provide the information to the state without any warrant,
and at times at a price. When an individual then turns to the state for recourse, the
state can argue the actions are permissible because it obtained it not from the
individual, but from a private entity. It has been argued that the Fourth Amend-
ment has roots in the prevention of government condoned civilian invasions of
privacy as well as governmental ones.2 48 It seems reasonable, therefore, that it
protects individuals from a surveillance system in which commercial entities take
this information without knowledge or voluntary consent of the individuals
and make it available to the government either for purchase, mining, or procedures
less cumbersome than a warrant. 249 When doing so, these entities function as
"forces alien to... Fourth Amendment freedoms.,9250 The government should not
be allowed to utilize such force without some compliance with the Fourth
Amendment.
Professor Brenner discusses how such an approach is actually an effort to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment, rather than a useful limit to its over-reach.
"Allocating the risk to the [c]onsumer gives the [g]overnment an incentive to see
that the [c]ollector breaches its agreement with [citizens]; this, in turn, would only
encourage [the] [g]overnment to abuse its leverage as a regulator and prosecu-
tor .... ,,251 Thus, it allows the government to abuse its power without being held
accountable. As Professor Hoofnagle notes, "[the] distinction between the risks of
government and commercial privacy risk is no longer tenable. 252
The argument that commercial conditioning is beyond the scope of the Fourth
247. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 477 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
248. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 234-37 (noting fifteenth century kings and parliaments began
authorizing trade guilds to search other's workmanship, which was followed by star chamber courts authorizing
searches directed at individuals for libel, and finally, general warrants).
249. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979) (stating in situations where an individual's
subjective expectations of privacy had been conditioned by "influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms," a normative inquiry into whether a legitimate expectation of privacy existed is proper).
250. Id.
251. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 261.
252. Hoofnagle, supra note 56, at 630-33.
[Vol. 50:341
KATZ ON A HOT TIN ROOF
Amendment because of the state action requirement can be overcome not by
focusing on whether the state originally took the information from the target.
Instead it could focus on the action of the government when it obtained the
information from the commercial entity. If the entity originally obtained the
information from an involuntary consumer, the government's attempt to access it
is nothing more than the government examining an area in which one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
253
While this Article does not claim these private entities act on behalf of the state,
when one looks to the reasoning behind "agent of the government" line of cases,
one sees support for this proposal. This line of cases finds when a private citizen
acts entirely on his own to obtain information illegally, and forwards it to law
enforcement without governmental encouragement or knowledge, then the govern-
ment may use said information, as no state actor has engaged in an unconstitutional
search. However, when the government asks, encourages, or knows about such
private activity and accepts such information, the private actor is deemed an agent
of the state and the action of that person is considered state action.
The Court recognized the importance of "the plain pirit and purpose of the
constitutional prohibitions intended to secure the people against unauthorized
official action."254 It cautioned for nearly a century against sanctioning activity
that violates the spirit of the protections of the Fourth Amendment:
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in
the matter of searches and seizures both in England and the colonies; and
the assurance against any revival of it, so carefully embodied in the fun-
damental law, is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods,
which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality
but which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right.
2 55
Therefore, it has long been recognized that the Fourth Amendment prohibits not
only direct government invasions of privacy, but also situations in which private
entities act as "instruments or agents" of the government. 6
In today's world in which technology is the primary form of surveillance, where
many investigations are online,257 where citizens are under constant video sur-
258 drnveillance from public and private entities, where drone use for both commercial
253. Professor Ohm has asserted the state action requirement is satisfied at the point the government issues a
request. Ohm, supra note 51, at 1339.
254. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
255. Id. at 33-34.
256. E.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443,487 (1971)).
257. Solove, supra note 13, at 1084 (explaining "law enforcement agencies have long sought personal
information about individuals from various third parties to investigate fraud, white-collar crime, drug trafficking,
computer crime, child pornography, and other types of criminal activity").
258. E.g., Cara Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 2007, at Al;
Steven Kinzer, Chicago Moving to 'Smart' Surveillance Cameras, N.Y. TrMEs, Sept. 21, 2004, at AI8; Jeffery
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and government surveillance is developed,2 59 and where the government is
accessing mined and fraudulently obtained personal data, the line between state
actor and private entity is increasingly blurred. In working through these scenarios,
courts have looked to two primary factors: (1) whether the government knew of or
acquiesced to the private search; and (2) whether the private industry intended to
assist law enforcement or had some other independent motive. 6 ° More than
knowledge is demanded, but the government must encourage, initiate, or instigate
the search.261
Jarrett v. United States is instructive. In Jarrett, a computer hacker sent
government agents information that a suspect possessed child pornography; the
262hacker discovered this by installing a Trojan horse on the suspect's computer.
While the police were unaware of his action at the time of its occurrence,
government agents subsequently exchanged email correspondence with the hacker.
They thanked him for his action, stating that if he engaged in the same action in
the future, he should "feel free to send" the evidence to them.26 3 While the
Fourth Circuit concluded thanking the hacker for his investigation after the fact
was insufficient to establish state action, "assurance[] ... that it was interested in
furthering its relationship with [the hacker] and availing itself of the fruits of any
information that [the hacker obtained]" would be enough even if it did not target a
specific individual. 26
Arguably, society has reached a similar place now. By congressional failure to
act,265 the government's explicit preference for industry growth over privacy con-
cerns, 266 the investment in private entities engaging in this kind of data collec-
tion,267 and the purchasing of the results of this collection for its own archiving,268
the government has done more than passively accept information from searches of
which it is unaware. To the contrary, it has assured these private actors it is
interested in such information and has availed itself of its fruits. This could be
Rosen, Protect Our Right to Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at A31 (reporting "in 2008, at a Google
conference on the future of law and technology,... the head of public policy at Google, said he expected that,
within a few years, public agencies and private companies would be asking Google to post live feeds from public
and private surveillance cameras all around the world.., anyone with a Web browser would be able to click on a
picture of anyone on any monitored street and follow his movements").
259. E.g., Ben Wolfgang, Bill Would Clip Wings of Private Drone Use, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 2012, at AO1;
The Drone Over Your Backyard: A Guide, THE WEEK, (June 8, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://theweek.com/article/index/
228830/the-drone-over-your-backyard-a-guide#.
260. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344-45.
261. Id. at 345.
262. Id. at 341.
263. Id. at 343.
264. Id. at 347.
265. The 112th Congress' House and Senate bills regarding Do Not Track legislation, H.R. 654,112th Cong.
(2012) and S. 913, 112th Cong. (2012), respectively were referred to committee and made no further progress.
266. See infra note 270.
267. Rosen, supra note 139, at 646.
268. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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construed as "prior acquiesce or encouragement" of such searches, which has been
held to be "implicit approval of all an informant's searches. 269
While this may seem like a stretch, technology often drives alterations to rules
that have been created to ensure that the spirit of the Fourth Amendment is truly
fulfilled. This is not new, and was the forcing function of Katz, Ciraolo, and Kyllo,
to name a few cases. Commercial conditioning cannot be allowed to facilitate the
government access to involuntarily obtained information by wrapping itself in the
mantle of a state action defense. To the contrary, this has created a world in which
the government will simply privatize its surveillance work, and collect the
aggregate data at the end of the process. Commercial conditioning plays a sig-
nificant role in that process. As a result it must be limited.
Congress thus far has failed to limit government access to information obtained
by primary or third party takers. Indeed, under the guise of capitalism, the
government has encouraged private entities to do its data collection for it. "The
[United States] Department of Commerce recently reiterated that the large-scale
collection ... of [online] personal information is central to the Internet economy;
and that regulation of online personal information must not impede commerce."
27o
Yet such an approach is perverse to the Fourth Amendment. "Nothing in the
history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that citizens should have to choose
between their constitutional rights and access to the most efficient means of
participating in commercial and personal affairs." 27' Yet, that is exactly where
commercial conditioning has taken society.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect individuals from govern-
ment intrusion into private aspects of their lives. The Third Party and Assump-
tion of Risk doctrines are designed to preclude individuals and suspects who
never intended their actions to be private from claiming, after the fact, that
they were private. However, as technology has developed, commercial entities
have created a world in which the Fourth Amendment cannot protect individ-
uals from government intrusion into their lives. Through their commercial con-
ditioning of society, commercial entities have made it impossible to assert a
Fourth Amendment claim in two ways. First they take information from indi-
viduals without their knowledge or voluntary consent. In so doing, they pre-
clude the victim from demonstrating a subjective expectation privacy, or one that
269. See United States v. Kline, 112 F. App'x 562, 564 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Walther,
652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating law enforcement's prior acquiescence or encouragement of an informant's
search may constitute implicit approval of all the informant's searches, thus making the informant a government
agent at all times)).
270. STEVENS, supra note 27, at 2.
271. Brenner & Clarke, supra note 14, at 262.
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society will find reasonable. Second, when the government obtains this taken
information, the government hides behind the Third Party doctrine to justify
its possession of the information. In essence the government has successfully
circumvented the Fourth Amendment protections. The pathway, however, was
laid by the commercial entities that facilitate this reality through commercial
conditioning.
The only way to restore the protections intended by the Fourth Amendment is to
re-invigorate the voluntary consent aspect to privacy protection found in both the
privacy cases as well as the Third Party Doctrine cases. These make clear that
information obtained from an individual can come in two forms. The first is that
which is voluntarily shared by him. The second is that such information was taken
from him. Courts must recognize when the government systematically accesses
information that was taken from an individual without knowledge or voluntary
consent, that individual must be protected. One way to do so is to demand Fourth
Amendment procedural protections for the body of information not voluntarily
disclosed.
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